Ukraine Today

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Increase from 40K to 300K is considerable and wouldn't be done needlessly. Do they know something we don't? What are they expecting?
They know what we all know. Moldova and Baltic states will be attacked and promptly taken if Russia sees them as easy prey.
And that means big war. So bumping European defences is paradoxically NATO’s last bid for peace.
Is this in preparation of UA's acceptance into NATO?
No, that’s not happening as long as there is no direct Russia vs NATO clash.
If they do invade Lithuania then anything is on the table. But that’s too unlikely.
 
They know what we all know. Moldova and Baltic states will be attacked and promptly taken if Russia sees them as easy prey.
And that means big war. So bumping European defences is paradoxically NATO’s last bid for peace.

No, that’s not happening as long as there is no direct Russia vs NATO clash.
If they do invade Lithuania then anything is on the table. But that’s too unlikely.
I see the advantages of a big NATO army, they should already be well trained and under a singular command structure.

Moldova confuses me. Isn't there already some territory occupied by the Russians?
 
Oh. If he wiki'ed (can you verb it?) 'Moldova' he wouldn't be any wiser since he'd have to know about Transnistria, and even then the (long) article says nothing about it being occupied.
How to wiki things:
1. wiki Moldova
[3rd sentence] The unrecognised breakaway region of Transnistria lies across the Dniester on the country's eastern border with Ukraine.
2. wiki/click Transnistria
[3rd sentence] Transnistria has been recognised only by three other unrecognised or partially recognised breakaway states: Abkhazia, Artsakh and South Ossetia,[11] and has a Russian military presence.
3. click Russian military presence [in Transnistria]
4. ENLIGHTENMENT!

Ok, it's not trivial, but if you start with "what are the damned Russians doing in Moldova?", you can get there relatively quickly and become even smarter than Mage in a few minutes.
 
Thank you. ?

It's all speculation due to the fog of war. I can not reliably estimate how bad it is on the front. But I am sure that regardless of the real situation, the Ukrainian leadership speaks of a dire situation mostly to press western allies who are still on the fence (specifically Germany and USA) to finally send in military aid in serious amounts.

The math in your last post is useless. Ukrainian territory is not homogenous when it comes to how defensible it is. The area around Donbas is heavily fortified, especially the cities. If Russians break the Donbas front, they will advance at a completely different pace.
And Russians are now fighting differently too. At first, they planned to take cities by storm. This was good for us because city warfare makes an advantage in artillery and armored vehicles less decisive. It's just a massive infantry slaughter-fest and our infantry is way more motivated and steadfast. After taking heavy losses Russians switched to a more brutal tactic. Now they raze towns to the ground with air strikes and long-range artillery making them indefensible. Our soldiers withdraw and they occupy the ruins. Rinse and repeat. So it's a losing battle for us until we get more western artillery. Lendlease won't start until October, Germans are still pulling our leg like a Turkish ice-cream vendor. So our strategy is to hold out, and slow down the Russian advance for now. We're waiting for the US to take a more decisive stance.
So in a way, the war actually happens on the diplomatic front. If the US refrains from increasing military support we eventually lose, simple as that.
I was aware of Russia's change in operational mode. Prolonged and intensive bombardment of defensible areas followed by advance eventually managed to achieve something for the Russians in Sievierodonetsk. It also cost them a lot, and it took 49 days. If we take the Ukrainian government at its word (and I don't see why we would not do so, albeit only in so far as those numbers are ballparks, after all, most independent open-source intelligence analyses and most Western "experts" who put in the analytical effort arrive at similar estimates of Russian losses to those distributed by Ukraine . . . I believe there was more disparity early in the war, but the Ukrainians probably realized that their efforts to exaggerate would lead to naught and have revised their methodology to insure that Western leadership can see they are not attempting to be too misleading).

49 Days, thousands of troops, hundreds of vehicles and other machines of war to take one small industrial town that was effectively right on the edge of the area the Russians have had under their control for years (and thus not at the culmination of a deep penetration into Ukrainian territory where their ad hoc supply lines would be stretched). That is the "might" of the Russian war machine . . . well, that and terrorizing civilian centers with periodic bombardments.

I deeply sympathize with the plight you and all Ukrainians face, but what I am trying to convey to you is that: hope is not lost, indeed, Ukraine's prospects should only grow and improve as the summer progresses. Imposing a state of hopelessness is precisely the goal of the Russian method at this stage, to demoralize not only your troops, but your entire society. THAT is why they expend limited and expensive long range missiles to attack blatantly civilian targets deep inside of strictly civilian areas. The small "pay out" of 30 dead and hundreds wounded is not the point; setting aside Russia's capacity to vaporize every city in Ukraine (and in all of Europe and North America, and China and India and pretty much all major cities everywhere on every continent) with its arsenal of medium and long-range nukes, Russia DOES NOT POSSESS THE CAPACITY to "grind down" Ukraine in the way it is so glibly described by various sell-out commentators to Putin's dream. It takes thousands of shells and bombs to "achieve" what they have achieved in a place like Mariupol or Sievierodonetsk, and while their actual stockpiles are probably only vaguely known, they are certainly not limitless. Moreover, their capacity to produce more is limited and every day your military is whittling away at their personnel and machines of war, further reducing the assets they have to carry on with the destruction.

Whether the values in the math I engaged in in the post to which you responded are perfectly accurate or not is not the point; certainly your point that the terrain is not homogeneous is apt. There will be areas of Donbas which the Russians will find easier to occupy, there will be additional areas of Donbas which Russians will find even more difficult to take than was Sievierodonetsk (this is assuming that all the signs we have of the level of professionalism, forethought, expertise, resolve and acumen in the Ukrainian leadership and military are not illusions, and that seems like a reasonable assumption to me). But I must disagree with you that the "math is useless." The model is precisely the sort of model which the Soviet military spent a great deal of effort compiling throughout the Cold War in drawing up estimates of necessary troop levels and armaments and ammunition to storm through Western Europe; all just mental exercises on paper which should not be taken to be precise engineering documentation or source code ready to debug! But precisely the type of fuzzy analytics which Napoleon and many past generals of renown engaged in habitually in countless military campaigns. The model I've used is a simple one I admit that freely, but it isn't like it couldn't be improved, for example by accounting for what fraction of those remaining 7317 square kilometers will have to be fought for at the same level of intensity as Sievierodonetsk, versus those that will not be, and those which will require even higher expenditure . . . For a back of the notepad excel sheet analysis done in 20 minutes before bed time and shared with a bunch of gamer sluts on an old bbs I think my resort was perfectly reasonable and perhaps even somewhat instructive.

The point is: Russia has a long way to go to achieve what they have stated to be their goal: to liberate the Donbas. The fact that it took them FORTY NINE DAYS and thousands of casualties to take one of the urban areas in that region (along with perhaps another 500 square kilometers of farm land and villages) is instructive. Not only this, but they concentrated a large fraction of their total assets committed to the war in Ukraine to this "advance." The whole point of it was symbolic "liberate 100% of Luhansk" as well as to create a "win" that their apologists, and fifth columnists around the world (as well as their raving lunatic State media propagandists) can all crow about as the greatest victory since Kursk.

NATO is also upping their game.

Jens Stoltenberg: "A broad dialogue between NATO and #Russia is no longer possible" #NATO will increase the number of rapid reaction forces from 40,000 to 300,000 people. In addition, the alliance promises to increase support for #Georgia and conduct more exercises there.

Increase from 40K to 300K is considerable and wouldn't be done needlessly. Do they know something we don't? What are they expecting? Is this in preparation of UA's acceptance into NATO?
Assuming there are no exaggerations going on there, I'd say that transitioning from 40,000 of the alliances troops stationed in readiness for a war with Russia to 300,000 is an enormous development. It doesn't really take much pressure off of Ukraine unfortunately because Russia knows NATO cannot declare war, per se (arguably NATOs operations in Afghanistan were not really a 'war" after all, and if it was it was "declared" on one of the member states so NATO didn't start it, etc., etc.. . .). But, it does tell Putin that Western countries are, finally!?, making at least pantomime of becoming serious about deterrence.

Deterrence means that you ready yourself for war with a potential enemy BEFORE there is a real threat. Quite the contrary to how some confused, pacifistic worldviews view building up a military for defensive purposes to be "provocative" or "de-stabilizing," it has often (I nearly said "generally" but that is probably a bit of an exaggeration) led to prolonged periods of peace. In any event, many of our generalizations from history become increasingly questionable in a world where a single vehicle can project enough firepower to destroy an entire neighborhood (or indeed, an entire metropolis if we consider nuclear-armaments).

It brings me some joy to see that common and decent folk in nations throughout the Free World are becoming aware of the axiom in that old Latin adage: Si vis pacem, para bellum.
 
Ofcourse, we could wiki pretty much everything and just avoid this entire thread. I mean, what is being asked or discussed here that we couldn't find anywhere else?
But this thread gives me something Wiki can't give me, a different insight. I responded to Weaver, since he mentioned it, on the off chance that he knew what was going on. I figured as much because he's been pretty insightful thus far and his proximity would allow him to highlight the things that are currently relevant and important.

Looks like a deal was made and Turkey's demands were met.

Saw that as well. I wonder what persuaded him. Public pressure? A backroom deal? Good news either way. Both have a considerable army and their geographical position would isolate Kaliningrad.
 
Whether the values in the math I engaged in in the post to which you responded are perfectly accurate or not is not the point; certainly your point that the terrain is not homogeneous is apt. There will be areas of Donbas which the Russians will find easier to occupy, there will be additional areas of Donbas which Russians will find even more difficult to take than was Sievierodonetsk (this is assuming that all the signs we have of the level of professionalism, forethought, expertise, resolve and acumen in the Ukrainian leadership and military are not illusions, and that seems like a reasonable assumption to me). But I must disagree with you that the "math is useless." The model is precisely the sort of model which the Soviet military spent a great deal of effort compiling throughout the Cold War in drawing up estimates of necessary troop levels and armaments and ammunition to storm through Western Europe; all just mental exercises on paper which should not be taken to be precise engineering documentation or source code ready to debug! But precisely the type of fuzzy analytics which Napoleon and many past generals of renown engaged in habitually in countless military campaigns. The model I've used is a simple one I admit that freely, but it isn't like it couldn't be improved, for example by accounting for what fraction of those remaining 7317 square kilometers will have to be fought for at the same level of intensity as Sievierodonetsk, versus those that will not be, and those which will require even higher expenditure . . . For a back of the notepad excel sheet analysis done in 20 minutes before bed time and shared with a bunch of gamer sluts on an old bbs I think my resort was perfectly reasonable and perhaps even somewhat instructive.
Basically, as I understand it, we have two more lines of layered defenses on Donbas to go after Severodonetsk/Lisichansk/Bachmut. It's Slovyansk/Kramatorsk/Konstantinovka and Barvinkovo/Dobropolye/Kurahovo. The first one may actually take many months. Unless there's an encirclement and they just push forward. If they break the second, the next front line will probably be somewhere close to Dnieper at Pavlograd/Gulyaypole.
We're being told Russians are almost out of breath. But they're one step away from announcing full mobilization. It's a huge country with lots of ancient armor stashed. They abstain from zerg rushing right now because it entails potential internal instability, but if all fails might just go for it.
The point is: Russia has a long way to go to achieve what they have stated to be their goal: to liberate the Donbas. The fact that it took them FORTY NINE DAYS and thousands of casualties to take one of the urban areas in that region (along with perhaps another 500 square kilometers of farm land and villages) is instructive. Not only this, but they concentrated a large fraction of their total assets committed to the war in Ukraine to this "advance." The whole point of it was symbolic "liberate 100% of Luhansk" as well as to create a "win" that their apologists, and fifth columnists around the world (as well as their raving lunatic State media propagandists) can all crow about as the greatest victory since Kursk.
Yes, but we've already lost a huge swath of southern regions. Kherson, most of Zaporozhye. We can not take them back without western heavy artillery and possibly even tanks.
The US has been arming us for defensive warfare. Stingers, Javelins. They're invaluable, I'm personally ever so grateful. But our army is not a middle-eastern guerilla type. And it's not a middle-eastern war. We can't win just by doing lots of damage and resisting until the invader packs and leaves. It's a modern European army that fights in a conventional war of conquest. We need to take those lands back with arms or we lose.
We can not sue for peace having 25% of our territory seized. Because it will mean when the next war starts, in 3, 5, or 8 years, we'll just lose 25% more. And it will because there is no reason for it not to.
 
Basically, as I understand it, we have two more lines of layered defenses on Donbas to go after Severodonetsk/Lisichansk/Bachmut. It's Slovyansk/Kramatorsk/Konstantinovka and Barvinkovo/Dobropolye/Kurahovo. The first one may actually take many months. Unless there's an encirclement and they just push forward. If they break the second, the next front line will probably be somewhere close to Dnieper at Pavlograd/Gulyaypole.
We're being told Russians are almost out of breath. But they're one step away from announcing full mobilization. It's a huge country with lots of ancient armor stashed. They abstain from zerg rushing right now because it entails potential internal instability, but if all fails might just go for it.

Yes, but we've already lost a huge swath of southern regions. Kherson, most of Zaporozhye. We can not take them back without western heavy artillery and possibly even tanks.
The US has been arming us for defensive warfare. Stingers, Javelins. They're invaluable, I'm personally ever so grateful. But our army is not a middle-eastern guerilla type. And it's not a middle-eastern war. We can't win just by doing lots of damage and resisting until the invader packs and leaves. It's a modern European army that fights in a conventional war of conquest. We need to take those lands back with arms or we lose.
We can not sue for peace having 25% of our territory seized. Because it will mean when the next war starts, in 3, 5, or 8 years, we'll just lose 25% more. And it will because there is no reason for it not to.
Referring to the part I bolded at the end: yes . . . I have been vaguely aware of this impending dynamic in the back of my head for weeks now. A buddy at another bbs I haunt said it like . . . well here let me quote him:
MadDog20/20 said:
I suspect that the grounds for selling out the Ukrainians are being carefully prepared.

Doing what needs to be done is looking hard and expensive. It's not like the ruling classes anywhere care that much about doing the right thing when money and position may be at stake. If the Russians had been successful with their 3 day invasion, there would have just been finger waggling.

When the Ukrainians were fighting for their lives, certain governments had to be prodded, kicked and shamed into acting, some still are foot dragging. Russia is still getting paid for it's energy. You have Turkey interfering with strengthening NATO while they should be kicked out themselves.

Regarding toughening up NATO, it's still all talk and promises.

Putin will probably want a ceasefire after he gets Donbas and Ukraine will get arm twisted into accepting it. Putin will rebuild and reorganize for his next move, essentially getting away with all of this crap, while jackoffs like Macron and Scholz pat themselves on the back.

Meanwhile, this would set Eastern Europe against Western Europe as the Easterners realize that the Westerners would be all too willing to sell them out, NATO member or not. Would Putin test that...sure, he would have gotten away with Ukraine, why not. He probably has the same opinion of Western European leaders that Hitler did..."worms". Eventually he'll go too far and we'll have WW3.

Then if anything is left afterwards and history books are written about it, they'll mention the tragic mistake of not shutting Putin down in Ukraine when we had the chance.

I suppose that will make Putin and his Western apologists quite pleased, but a frozen conflict in Ukraine in which Russia occupies 20 or 25% of the country and Ukraine refuses to peace is not really a good thing for anyone.

Better to get it over with quickly and accept the immediate risks that involves than to kick the can down the road I think; and by that I mean: provide Ukraine with AS MUCH weaponry as possible as quickly as possible.

The other thing that I wanted to comment on is the: "Russia is almost out of breath" part. Gulls, Putin-apologists, Russoboos and totalitarian-groupies like to point to "polls" of Putin's high popularity among the Russian population, but I am intensely skeptical about any such evidence. Russia has no opposition media, no opposition politics, and is effectively a police state in which any dissenting opinion about the ruling regime or the "special operation" can be met with harsh penalties.

If Putin is so popular then why is it necessary to repress all dissent at all? If he is so popular then why have so many Russians fled to other countries since the February invasion? If the regime is so popular and solidary and strong, then why have there been so many strange deaths and obvious assassinations of fringe elites? Why so many officials sacked? Why the fires and explosions all over Russia? Last I heard, there had been something like 60 apparent acts of sabotage in Russia since February and many, perhaps most of these are quite remote from the Ukrainian border.

Clearly, there is a segment of the Russian public who are devout believers in the Putin dream to restore the Russian empire to its former glory, along with all of the other ethnocentric, genocidal, irredentist garbage that is packaged along with that "dream." But how large IS that segment really? If it is only 2% that is a big difference than if it is 20% or 50%, and I have a very hard time imagining it is anywhere near 50%.

There is a Youtube channel called "1420 Project" which interviews people in the area of a college campus in a major Russian city about topics that pertain to the Ukraine war (and which honestly strike me as very risky for the creators to be doing), and a consistent pattern there is that only about 1 in 10 Russians who are interviewed on the street espouse views which are distinctly pro-Putin. Many are evasive or decline to comment at all, which is in itself a sign that they do not fully agree with Putin or his fantasy war to de-Nazify Ukraine.

Clearly the Russian state has a dramatic advantage when it comes to suppressing or fighting back against any form or armed insurgency among Russians, but that form of dissent barely got involved in the 1991 collapse at all. My understanding is that the 1991 collapse can be best thought of as a kind of "grinding to a halt" because of accumulated inertia and corrosion at all levels of the society. The Soviet Union rusted into a pile of inert junk and then pieces started breaking off to pursue their own best-interests.

A scenario not unlike that seems like a possibility for the current regime as well. I do not pretend to be a specialist in Russian history or sociology, and have only read a small handful of books and articles that deal with Russian history, but based on what I know the takeaway in the following video are not implausible
 
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OMG, the right-wing conspiracies. I didn't miss them.

But back to reality, Putin will decide when to stop and when the army can't go on anymore.
I assume he has a realistic war aim now, like Donbas+land bridge to Crimea+extras for negotiations. At one moment both parties would be exhausted and seeking a TRUCE, not peace, because Ukraine can't accept Russian demands in Donbas (although it can in Crimea). So, we will enter a long and uncertain phase of "warm" war with incidents, with both sides needing a break to rebuild and retrain to continue campaigning. What will trigger the next very hot war phase it's hard to tell at this point, but Ukraine, as the injured party, will start it.
The West would give what it can afford and more, but there are obvious limits to this, funds are not infinite.
 
The following are the commitments made by the Nordic countries:

1 - Finland and Sweden will not provide support to YPG/PYD, and the organization described as FETO in Türkiye. Türkiye also extends its full support to Finland and Sweden against threats to their national security. Finland and Sweden reject and condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, in the strongest terms. Finland and Sweden unambiguously condemn all terrorist organizations perpetrating attacks against Türkiye, and express their deepest solidarity with Türkiye and the families of the victims.

2 - Finland and Sweden confirm that the PKK is a proscribed terrorist organization. Finland and Sweden commit to prevent activities of the PKK and all other terrorist organizations and their extensions, as well as activities by individuals in affiliated and inspired groups or networks linked to these terrorist organizations. Türkiye, Finland and Sweden have agreed to step up cooperation to prevent the activities of these terrorist groups. Finland and Sweden reject the goals of these terrorist organizations.

3 - Further to this, Finland refers to several recent amendments of its Criminal Code by which new acts have been enacted as punishable terrorist crimes. The latest amendments entered into force on 1 January 2022, by which the scope of participation in the activity of a terrorist group has been widened. At the same time, public incitement related to terrorist offenses was criminalized as a separate offense. Sweden confirms that a new, tougher, Terrorist Offenses Act enters into force on July 1, and that the government is preparing further tightening of counter-terrorism legislation.

4 - Türkiye, Finland and Sweden confirm that now there are no national arms embargoes in place between them. Sweden is changing its national regulatory framework for arms exports in relation to NATO Allies. In future, defense exports from Finland and Sweden will be conducted in line with Alliance solidarity and in accordance with the letter and spirit of article 3 of the Washington Treaty.

5 - Türkiye, Finland and Sweden committed to the following concrete steps:

- Establish a joint, structured dialogue and cooperation mechanism at all levels of government, including between law enforcement and intelligence agencies, to enhance cooperation on counterterrorism, organized crime, and other common challenges as they so decide.

- Finland and Sweden will conduct the fight against terrorism with determination, resolve, and in accordance with the provisions of the relevant NATO documents and policies, and will take all required steps to tighten further domestic legislation to this end.

- Finland and Sweden will address Türkiye’s pending deportation or extradition requests of terror suspects expeditiously and thoroughly, taking into account information, evidence and intelligence provided by Türkiye, and establish necessary bilateral legal frameworks to security cooperation with Türkiye, in accordance with the European Convention on Extradition.

- Finland and Sweden will investigate and interdict any financing and recruitment activities of the PKK and all other terrorist organizations and their extensions, as well affiliates or inspired groups or networks.

- Türkiye, Finland and Sweden commit to fight disinformation, and prevent their domestic laws from being abused for the benefit or promotion of terrorist organizations, including through activities that incite violence against Türkiye.

- Finland and Sweden will ensure that their respective national regulatory frameworks for arms exports enable new commitments to Allies and reflects their status as NATO members.

6 - For the implementation of these steps, Türkiye, Finland and Sweden will establish a Permanent Joint Mechanism, with the participation of experts from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Justice, as well as Intelligence Services and Security Institutions. The Permanent Joint Mechanism will be open for others to join.

7 - Türkiye also confirmed its long-standing support for NATO’s Open Door policy, and agrees to support at the 2022 Madrid Summit the invitation of Finland and Sweden to become members of NATO.



From now on, Turkey always reference this agreement when there is a debate about YPG/PYD in NATO. Although NATO recognize PKK as a terrorist group, NATO not recognizing YPG/PYD as a terrorist group is always one of the Turkey's concern.
 
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The following are the commitments made by the Nordic countries:

1 - Finland and Sweden will not provide support to YPG/PYD, and the organization described as FETO in Türkiye. Türkiye also extends its full support to Finland and Sweden against threats to their national security. Finland and Sweden reject and condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, in the strongest terms. Finland and Sweden unambiguously condemn all terrorist organizations perpetrating attacks against Türkiye, and express their deepest solidarity with Türkiye and the families of the victims.

2 - Finland and Sweden confirm that the PKK is a proscribed terrorist organization. Finland and Sweden commit to prevent activities of the PKK and all other terrorist organizations and their extensions, as well as activities by individuals in affiliated and inspired groups or networks linked to these terrorist organizations. Türkiye, Finland and Sweden have agreed to step up cooperation to prevent the activities of these terrorist groups. Finland and Sweden reject the goals of these terrorist organizations.

3 - Further to this, Finland refers to several recent amendments of its Criminal Code by which new acts have been enacted as punishable terrorist crimes. The latest amendments entered into force on 1 January 2022, by which the scope of participation in the activity of a terrorist group has been widened. At the same time, public incitement related to terrorist offenses was criminalized as a separate offense. Sweden confirms that a new, tougher, Terrorist Offenses Act enters into force on July 1, and that the government is preparing further tightening of counter-terrorism legislation.

4 - Türkiye, Finland and Sweden confirm that now there are no national arms embargoes in place between them. Sweden is changing its national regulatory framework for arms exports in relation to NATO Allies. In future, defense exports from Finland and Sweden will be conducted in line with Alliance solidarity and in accordance with the letter and spirit of article 3 of the Washington Treaty.

5 - Türkiye, Finland and Sweden committed to the following concrete steps:

- Establish a joint, structured dialogue and cooperation mechanism at all levels of government, including between law enforcement and intelligence agencies, to enhance cooperation on counterterrorism, organized crime, and other common challenges as they so decide.

- Finland and Sweden will conduct the fight against terrorism with determination, resolve, and in accordance with the provisions of the relevant NATO documents and policies, and will take all required steps to tighten further domestic legislation to this end.

- Finland and Sweden will address Türkiye’s pending deportation or extradition requests of terror suspects expeditiously and thoroughly, taking into account information, evidence and intelligence provided by Türkiye, and establish necessary bilateral legal frameworks to security cooperation with Türkiye, in accordance with the European Convention on Extradition.

- Finland and Sweden will investigate and interdict any financing and recruitment activities of the PKK and all other terrorist organizations and their extensions, as well affiliates or inspired groups or networks.

- Türkiye, Finland and Sweden commit to fight disinformation, and prevent their domestic laws from being abused for the benefit or promotion of terrorist organizations, including through activities that incite violence against Türkiye.

- Finland and Sweden will ensure that their respective national regulatory frameworks for arms exports enable new commitments to Allies and reflects their status as NATO members.

6 - For the implementation of these steps, Türkiye, Finland and Sweden will establish a Permanent Joint Mechanism, with the participation of experts from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Justice, as well as Intelligence Services and Security Institutions. The Permanent Joint Mechanism will be open for others to join.

7 - Türkiye also confirmed its long-standing support for NATO’s Open Door policy, and agrees to support at the 2022 Madrid Summit the invitation of Finland and Sweden to become members of NATO.



From now on, Turkey always reference this agreement when there is a debate about YPG/PYD in NATO. Although NATO recognize PKK as a terrorist group, NATO not recognizing YPG/PYD as a terrorist group is always one of the Turkey's concern.

That is more or less what I suspected Turkey wanted, and to be honest, it seems like a rather piddly concession. I'm sure Kurdish folks might disagree, but it should be pointed out: there is apparently no clause(s) in any of NATO's charter documents which address how a member state can be, or is to be "ejected" from the alliance. This was pointed out to me by some anti-NATO Putin-shill "buddies" on another board, so I cannot say for certain it is true, but doesn't surprise me if it is true. The prospect of being ejectable at a whim of the dominant parties is not something which would have been appealing to smaller member states, and I doubt it would've been on the minds of the folks who drew up the original NATO foundational documents either.

What this means is: once Sweden and Finland are in, they are in for permanent, Turkey can object all it wants, but the only recourse they will have once Sweden and Finland are in are standard back-stabby, passive-aggressive, drama-queen relations, i.e., "diplomacy."

Sweden and Finland are also healthy democracies with a revolving door of ruling regimes. Not hard or inconceivable at all if 4 or 5 years hence, new administrations in either or both decide that the agreements made by the preceding administrations cannot be fully honored.

Turkey probably understood at some level that it was a losing game to attempt to thwart the introduction of Sweden and Finland, and also that it is equally or even more behooved to have NATO grow to include those two nations: Russia and Turkey are fair-weather friends at best.
 
There's a lot to unpack here.

well you can try.
this was brought to my attention ^ along with information about numerous kills of certain individuals by the regimes of the previous and the current presidents of Ukraine. Oles Buzina is one of them.
There is also a video with Ukranian PoWs after the events at Azovstal. Neo-nazi battalions that were created years before are still active.
But i digress. I just want to know how come that "corrupt" Zelensky of yesterday, is a "hero" Zelensky of today?
 
There are a lot of battle places in Ukraine. I want to show you some of them. The first place is "Height of Konev". There was battle between Russian & German forces in august 1943 when Kharkov was realised.


 
it seems like a rather piddly concession.
I am quite sure it will turn out to be "diplomacy" as you call it once they are in NATO. What is important here for Turkey is that YPG/PYD are mentioned, maybe not as directly as terrorists, but mentioned in a same document with PKK as "threats to Turkey's national security". So Turkey legitimatized that YPG/PYD is a threat to Turkey's national security in the eyes of NATO.
 
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