Weaver 说:
But yeah, I'll be waiting for your more detailed post in the relevant thread. Should be an interesting read.
Good luck with the exam.
Ok, well, here you go:
I will firstly describe what naturalism and positivism is. I also need to say that the quotes are translated from Czech texts so if they don't make sense or cannot be googled, it is because I am not a native speaker, and because texts like these are not exactly easy to succesfuly translate.
Positivism is built on two main theses:
1.
The pedigree thesis that says that legal validity is
a function of certain social facts and not merits of the law. Ie. a law is a law because it is comes from some sovereign, passes a procedure for a creation of law and so on, no matter what the actual content of the said law is. Basically: just because some law would be morally super-good, it is not a law until we make it a law.
2
The separability thesis that says that law and morality do not need to interact, ie. that validity of law
does not need to be tied to its morality (although it often will be that way).
In regards to the separability thesis, the morality does not neccesarily mean moral as in morally good in its substance, it means it needs to adhere to some extra-legal requirements. For example Lon Fuller uses
internal morality of law which is a set of rules that concern things that people generally do not ascribe to morality and are more of a procedural substance. Basically, Fuller says that (in a sense of the separability thesis) a law that says:
"children will be taken from their mothers and raised elsewhere" is not immoral and can be a law, whereas a law that says:
"Susan's child born twenty years ago will be raised elsewhere on Fridays and elsewhere on Thursdays and by Hannah on Fridays as long as that child was born ten years ago" is immoral and therefore is not a law. Gustav Radbruch will (probably) say:
"children will be taken from their mothers and raised elsewhere" is completely unjust and is therefore an unlawful law (unrichtiges Recht) which is not a law.
Since naturalism is - like positivism after all - broad and there are many different concepts, I will just define it just with non-positivist approach, ie.
1. Law (or morals, since morals are part of law) exists regardless of social facts - it simply is.
2. Morality and legal validity are connected - ie. immoral law ceases to be law.
This is literally what there is to this distinction. Positivists will scold naturalist like this: "you do not distinguish between what law is (description) and what law ought to be (prescription). We are positivists so we can research and describe (every law) but you do not because your theory by defitiniton cannot work with immoral law. Positivism is a theory of every law, whereas naturalism is a theory of ideal law."
Robert Alexy (who is a non-positivist) describe three concepts of validity: sociological, moral and legal. Sociological validity is more or less what kurczak described: a law is valid if it is enforced. Moral validity means that its content is not immoral. Legal validity means legal validity stricto sensu and also include either sociological validity or moral validity or both. Stricto sensu legal validity means that it adheres to formal rules, but unlike the two other concepts, it cannot stand on its own because it is circular (it is formally valid because it abides procedural norms, procedural norms are formally valid because they abide constitutional norms, constitutional norms are formally valid because they abide metanorms and so on and on). If it includes moral validity for you, you are a naturalist, if it does not, you are a positivist.
Last point here would be that that positivist separability thesis says that the connection is not necessary, not that it must not be here. This leads to a division of
inclusive and exclusive positivism. Both groups agree that there can be a legal system in which morality is not connected to legal validity (a law is valid but is immoral) but inclusive positivists think that there can be (and is) legal system in which legal validity is tied to morality (a law is valid because it is moral). Basically, a naturalist will say:
legal validity is determined by moral validity. Inclusive positivist will say:
legal validity is determined by moral validity, but there can be a system in which this is not true. Exclusive positivist will say:
legal validity is not determined by moral validity ever. Exlusive positivist version of the Separability thesis (the Separation thesis) says: morality and law
must be divided.
Jules Coleman illustrates it on an example that is present in pretty much every legal system: legal norms that say something along the lines of:
"legal norms cannot violate human dignity." This prima facie
is a moral requirement and it can illustrate how in regular practice the distinction between positivism and naturalism does not really matter. A naturalist will say for example: but of course, it is apparent, this norm only declares a norm that exists. Inclusive positivist: yes, this incorporates morality into law. Exclusive positivist: this does not incorporate morality into law, it merely uses morality as a kind of an extra-legal requirement but it does not incorporates it. It is the same as when private international law orders a judge to use a legal norm of Costa Rica. Yes, he uses it, but it does not become a part of our law. But in the end, all three will assess the morality of said law, and all three will not apply immoral law. And every one of them will be consistent with their viewpoint.
One of the more radical exlusive positivist is Joseph Raz. In 1979 in the
Authority of Law he wrote:
"The demand of law for a legitimite authority is not only a demand for legal rules to be reasons [for some behavior]. It also includes a demand that other rules should not be reasons for nonconformist behaviour." This means, yes, that a legal norm implicitly tells me to ignore other non-legal norms that are in contradiction. But we must again think that positivism is a descriptive theory of (every law) which means that it tries to keep morality out of law, not out of reasoning of what we ought to do. Or better - it wants to tell apart what we
ought to do based on legal reasons from what we
ought to do because of other reasons. They say that if we put morality into legal reasoning, we lose the legal reasoning (Do X if it is morally sound = do what is morally sound). Ad absurdum, the legend of the conquest of Alexandria by Umar ibn Al-Khattāb:
"Burn the library. If what is in the books is in accordance with the Quran, we don't need the books; if what is there is in opposition to the Quran, it is wrong and we don't need the books." Similarly, if morality is a requirement for validity of law, we don't need law. Positivists don't like morality in law because it blurs the law and makes it harder to describe law. But positivism does not require anyone to think that legal reasons are a priori stronger than moral reasons. It just draws a clear line between them.
It is wrong to think that even exclusive positivists defend immoral application of law. Exclusive positivists do differentiate between legal reasons and moral reasons but draw no implications for the decision-making. In terms of prescription, positivists end at:
yes, do decide in accordance with morals and even contra lege, go ahead, but for gods sake, just don't call it a legal decision. It was illegal.. If an exclusive positivist looks at your average ECHR ruling, he will not say:
this is wrong because it stems from morals and therefore you should not have done that. He will say:
you ruled this way, but you have reached your decision by moral decisions, not legal.
Now, there exist the so called Normative positivism (there is also a term Prescriptive positivism (and democratic, Benthamish or ethical) but I am not sure if these two differ or not; i will use them as if they mean the same thing) that more or less does say that legal reasoning is more important than moral reasoning. They say that the best law is the one that does not have moral reasoning anywhere in it, nor in its application (!!! common descriptive positivists, both inclusive and exclusive, are not concerned with this !!!). The trouble is that prescriptive positivism is not really a positivism as was outlined above, since positivism is a theory of every law, whereas naturalism is a theory of ideal law, and if normative positivism says what ought to be, it kind of ceases to describe every law. Not to mention this - they construct the need to avoid morals in legal practice on things like morality not having democratic legitimity, creating ambiguities, making it harder to have legitimate expectations and so on (
"As long as there is moral reasoning in law, results of judicial trials will be affected by a person of the judge and his own moral reasoning. Let's eliminate this element. Let's replace a justice (iurisprudence) that uses moral reasoning with the one that doesn't." - Waldron, J. Lucky in your judge) . But this
is a moral argument because
we want democracy is not a legal argument. If we even accept that Normative positivism is positivism (which kinda is, since they hold positivist view on both positivist theses, it is just that they defy the descriptive goal of positivism), Normative positivists are heretics of positivism.
And now I can finally get to adress your post

It will be rather short, though.
Weaver 说:
I would describe naturalists as believing that their morality should be the law and positivists as believing that defying current legal system is absolutely immoral.
Positivists cannot say that defying legal system is absolutely immoral because they try to look at law separately from morals. And if they have law that does not incorporate morality, and they research law (I don't know how to put, mabye: law is an object of their interest) how can they end up with operating with morality? Where does the morality come from? It is not in law and they are describing law. How can morality appear out of thin air? They would need to reach somewhere out of the legal system but that is not a task of positivism.
If a positivist says that prefering morality to law is immoral, he is not talking out of a position of positivism because positivism is descriptive not prescriptive.
Confusing positivism with legalism, textualism or formalism is dangerous and completely false.
They are not even in the same category! Positivism is a theory of
what law is, formalism, textualism or legalism are
methonds of interpretation of law! This goes in hand with a myth I have referenced in the previous post: the Radbruch myth that holds that Nazi justice was so abhorrent because Nazi judges were positivists (and assumption that
lawful positivism (Gesetzepositivismzus, ie. legalism) = positivism, which is not ture). This is wrong (because nazi judges were horrible because they were naturalists), but for some reason this is also used to attack contemporary positivism despite the fact that no (bar some individuals and French positivist school tied to the Code Civil that used to be a thing in the 19th century) positivist embrace legalism.
Formalism is about providing guidelines for behaviour in application or interpretation of law that limit judicial discretion. It says what I should do to meet some goals. Textualism is a method of interpretation of written statutes that limits judge's "misinterpretation" of the text so we can avoid the situation in which a judge does something different that what the lawmaker had in mind. It says what I should do to meet some goals. Legalism is strict adherence to law and is some kind of a mix of the above two. It says what I should do to meet some goals. And now - the positivism. Positivism says what law is. That is all. Nothing more.
These things are not in any way interconnected.
The caricature of positivism (
"we should obey the law no matter what because it is law") therefore does not make any sense. And is - as I have written before - either originating in a lack of knowledge in legal philosophy or it is a mere justification of a willful disregard for moral questions that is hidden behind big words and large philosophical concepts. It is in a way similar to how "as a matter of principle" is used in general conversation. "As a matter of principle" is a cop-out that we usually use when we can not sufficiently explain (or we don't want to) explain our position.
I don't go to ballet as a matter of principle. Similarly, a caricature of positivism is brought when we want to avoid answering a moral argument.
She was fined 500.000$ for a relatively small crime and it will destroy her business completely, but hey, I am a positivist and law is a law. It doesn't make sense and is really lazy, because you can still legitimately use arguments about legal certainty, but no, we will just wrongly involve positivism.
I will quote Hart, who is - albeit not recent - one of the most influential positivist:
"If we stand before perverted demands, in what sense is it better to say: "this is not law at all" instead of: "this is law, but it is too perverted to be employed or abided. [...]
Bad people will create morally wrong rules that other people will apply in practice. For the people to clearly think when confronted with expoliting the power, it is primarily important to not forget that an acknowledgement of legal validity does not solve a question of obedience and that no matter the size of the authority of the majesty or the authority of the official system, its requirement must in the end be subjected to a moral review." H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law
And, since it is a nice quote, John Gardner:
"Legal positivism tells us that should the judges use legal norms, these norms are based on certain sources. But it leaves the disturbing question of if and when should a court use legal norms." J. Gardner, Legal Positivism 5 1/2 Myths.
Weaver 说:
Maybe they don't. Maybe there are situations where a positivist will decide that there are concerns to be taken into account that are just as important as "natural" rights of a human being and cumulatively may even trample them. From this point of view a law does not have to be bad and morally corrupt if it infringes on rights naturalists believe everyone is entitled to.
I don't think determining where the line for getting into the essence of the human right (as in, what is permissible and what not) depends on positivism / naturalism distinction. Ultimately, it will be weighed by morals and as I have demonstrated above, morality is part of decision-making of both naturalists and positivists. They just name things differently in most cases.
Weaver 说:
So to me this scale is very relevant in this conversation. Naturalists say that any province or region should be able to proclaim independence even unilaterally and that is the only morally sound approach. Positivists believe that acting outside the established if imperfect legal boundaries disregarding potentially disastrous repercussions is a dangerous and irresponsible idea. Hence actually immoral.
No. A naturalist does not translate into some hardcore Kantian who thinks that even the smallest right should be viewed through the fiat iustitia pereat mundus optics. Naturalists have no qualms with positive law - a naturalist will tell that a speed limit of 50 kmh is a law. Because it has no connection to morality. But he will also tell you that unjust law is still law; as long as the law is not unbearably unjust. Naturalist's escape to metaphysic realm will be the last trenchline he will retreat to, but before that he will employ "positivist" argumentation. There is no difference in approach of positivism / naturalism unless we are in a Sharia country / Nazi Germany / Mordor / Orwellian Oceania.
Lastly, someone write something. I am pretty much the only one posting in this thread and I dont want to have quadruplepost the next time
