Does Combat Experience Make a Better General?

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Archonsod said:
Fortifications and entrenchment had reached the point they could provide adequate protection against artillery, and at the outbreak of the war there was nothing to replace it in being able to smash a fortified position.
It doesn't really matter how good your generals are or how prepared for war you get when you literally lack the means to accomplish your goals.
By WWII equilibrium had been restored thanks to the development of air power and the tank, so once again it became a question of manoeuvre.

Shouldn't gas be mentioned somewhere?

Good post.
 
Archonsod said:
Swadius said:
this I believe is what a general is for.
No, you're confusing the role of the general with that of the commander in chief. A general leads an army in battle, the commander is the one responsible for the overall conduct of the war. The general's task is simply to win the battle he's asked to wage; while an understanding of the strategic goals or overall picture of the war are useful (insofar as they can influence the strategy he adopts on the ground) it's not his place to make decisions at that level.

I suspect we're entering muddy waters here. There are times in history where there were clear separation between the overall commanding authority and the one on the ground doing the execution. Modern day wars (at least in the developed parts) are mostly conducted in a manner where the generals listen to the civilian or appointed civilian liaison to the executive office.
But I think there are other times where the general was more or less given free reign in conducting the war to his or her own pleasure. Von Manstein for example, without taking into account Hitler's foolery, more or less planned the execution and overlooked a great deal of the execution himself. He was a Field Marshal, but I don't think that being a commander of commanders makes him any less of a general. Likewise, Caius Julius Caesar was also given a lot of free reign, and at the mid point outright denied any authority than himself, to conquer a majority of the Gallic tribes. A centurion might know how to march a column of his own cohort, but there are aspects of moving a vast bodies of men around where some lessons of moving around a few people will diminish and become extenuated. Problems of securing a supply line, or what place is appropriate in foraging and which isn't, how would you deal with civilians and it's subsequent impact on the goals, what are the overall goals is something that can't be viewed in the persepctive of combat experience. One would either have to theorize, or read other people's theories to gain perspective about what's important and what generally isn't. There has to be a list of priorities that a general of this ilk must attend to. These things are not something clearly evident when one gets promoted to this position from a middle of the rank combat officer.
Napolean also lead his armies and planned their strategical aims of the wars he fought. In contrast to his adherence to tried and true strategies and tactics, Guderian and other young officers although with a lack of as much combat experience as some of the superiors who opposed his theories, had great insight into the level of technology being infused into the army and how they can be used in the most optimal manner. He did have some experience with the command structures during WWI as an intelligence officer, and to be frank, if the question is better phrased as in: out of the two, does combat experience or commanding experience make a better general? I think we would agree that the latter is more important for any actor functionaling as a general.

Direct combat experience might help him, but there are limits to what he can derive from his experiences.
Not really. Theory is something that's not particularly useful until things like combined arms begin to make an appearance. Until then, it's simply a case of understanding how to ensure your troops are victorious which broadly speaking is something you can learn entirely from experience.

Sure if you're an early greek hoplite or the head of a tribal force where you only have the normal hand to hand soldier and some complimentary skirmishers. But when armies become more sophisticated, with the inclusion and use of cavalry for instance, one can appeal to experience alone to tell the general what to do with them. They must theorize themselves about the usage of mounted soldiers to properly employ them in the best possible manner. Having some experience might help the general react and prepare for some events that might cause his troops some distress, but leaving that stuff to the people who specilize in that is more of less normal for any person that commands people. It doesn't make a general bad that he appoints one of his commanders to work out the practical implimentation of his theories. In fact, any person above a the lowest rank has the responsibility of mitigating work to other people more experienced in matters then them.
Having some experience is always good, but knowing who has better insight into their experience is much better. One might be tempted to say that you must have some experience yourself to know who has such insight, but as history can tell you, it doesn't help all that much if at all. in determining who has it. It's quite common now, WWII, WWI, and throughout history of older officers with more experience in live combat are more or less always in disagreement about how to use the resources that they have.
 
Austupaio said:
Shouldn't gas be mentioned somewhere?
Gas didn't work. Problem with Europe is it has a prevailing Westerly wind ...

Swadius said:
But I think there are other times where the general was more or less given free reign in conducting the war to his or her own pleasure.
Only when the commander was at the same time the head of state, which you had for a brief period during the middle ages and virtually nowhere else. And even then, they were the exception rather than the rule.
I don't think that being a commander of commanders makes him any less of a general.
Like I said, a general commands an army. That's the definition of the general. If he didn't have an army, he's not a general. If he does command an army, then he is a general, irrespective of whatever other jobs he may hold alongside it.
One would either have to theorize, or read other people's theories to gain perspective about what's important and what generally isn't.
Erm wut? The big problem you're going to have now is to explain how anyone can actually come up with these theories in the first place if they cannot experience them to begin with. And then once you realise why that statement is silly, you'll need to explain why the theory would do a better job of teaching than the actual experience.

Also, grand strategic goals are the worst part to theorise on. You can understand your own position, political ambition et al, but it's useless unless you also know your opponent, and the only way to gain a good knowledge of your opponent is via experience. Again, theory hits the problem of requiring predictability, which is something lacking in nations as much as their people.
Napolean also lead his armies and planned their strategical aims of the wars he fought.
Napoleon also started as a corporal in the artillery ...
Sure if you're an early greek hoplite or the head of a tribal force where you only have the normal hand to hand soldier and some complimentary skirmishers. But when armies become more sophisticated, with the inclusion and use of cavalry for instance, one can appeal to experience alone to tell the general what to do with them.
Yes you can. It's not rocket science and generals weren't drooling idiots. Man + Horse = Man go faster.

It's not until specialised knowledge and technology is deployed that theory becomes useful. Early black powder artillery required an understanding of trigonometry and mathematics to employ; theory then becomes useful for the general as it can shortcut a mathematics degree.

 
Combat experience can help a general make better decisions in certain situations (or worse in certain situations). There have been plenty of inexperienced generals winning great battles. Combat experience is just one of the many factors in a battle and probably not nearly the most important. It doesn't take a genius to command an army, and even a genius needs a good amount of luck, soldiers, planning, etc. Sometimes experience can be the factor to decide who wins and loses but many times it just comes down to luck.
 
In pretty much any social endeavor, theory is useful in knowing what variables other people have considered important. There's no exact science, so theory cannot be a blueprint for automatic success, but it helps prevent a leader from overlooking obvious pitfalls into which others have stumbled in the past.
 
the generals of WW1 are a perfect argument in favour of experience: none of them on either side were used to trench warfare and had to learn about it as they went along. they used strategies learnt from killing half naked Africans armed with sticks against well armed, strongly fortified and reinforced soldiers, which is why so many troops died.. If the generals had actually been present in the trenches rather than miles behind in comfort, it wouldve been impossible to miss the futility of attacking. The Germans figured this out much sooner than the allies and as a result they lost less men
 
gutsaxe said:
the generals of WW1 are a perfect argument in favour of experience: none of them on either side were used to trench warfare and had to learn about it as they went along. they used strategies learnt from killing half naked Africans armed with sticks against well armed, strongly fortified and reinforced soldiers, which is why so many troops died.. If the generals had actually been present in the trenches rather than miles behind in comfort, it wouldve been impossible to miss the futility of attacking. The Germans figured this out much sooner than the allies and as a result they lost less men

Hold on there, I actually think they must have been theorizing about that stuff to abstract the idea that what they were doing wasn't working. Direct experience won't teach you anything, you need a level of insight to come up with new tactics and strategies.

Archonsod said:
One would either have to theorize, or read other people's theories to gain perspective about what's important and what generally isn't.
Erm wut? The big problem you're going to have now is to explain how anyone can actually come up with these theories in the first place if they cannot experience them to begin with. And then once you realise why that statement is silly, you'll need to explain why the theory would do a better job of teaching than the actual experience.

Alright, the role of the general I'll cede.

Onto the quote. You can't experience theory, people have to come up with them upon reflection, I doubt that anyone would have a theoretical epiphany in the midst of fighting for their own life. Knowing how to abstract what is happening in the data is important, and for a great part, it can be taught, the rest will rely on the talent and genius of the commander.

Also, grand strategic goals are the worst part to theorise on. You can understand your own position, political ambition et al, but it's useless unless you also know your opponent, and the only way to gain a good knowledge of your opponent is via experience. Again, theory hits the problem of requiring predictability, which is something lacking in nations as much as their people.

I don't think the type of experiences claimed in the OP would be all that insightful into the motives of your political opponent. Stabbing someone in the gut, in otherwise "frontline fighting" isn't going to grant Saladin or Lionheart knowledge they can use against their opponents strategically.

Napolean also lead his armies and planned their strategical aims of the wars he fought.
Napoleon also started as a corporal in the artillery ...

Yes he did, but I think his success had more to do with his level of study of prior military greats than the experience he and others like him gained on the field. There is level of raw talent that he had over the others, but I think the dedication of learning the theories behind the failures and successes of past generals helped him a great deal more.

Sure if you're an early greek hoplite or the head of a tribal force where you only have the normal hand to hand soldier and some complimentary skirmishers. But when armies become more sophisticated, with the inclusion and use of cavalry for instance, one can appeal to experience alone to tell the general what to do with them.
Yes you can. It's not rocket science and generals weren't drooling idiots. Man + Horse = Man go faster.[/quote]

Horse + man = Man go faster, so what? If this is something the person has never used before, it's not going to help him very much about what he's going to do with it. I'm going to claim that knowing how cavalry affects the army and strategic position as a whole is mostly derived from a theoretical approach rather than an experiential one.

It's not until specialised knowledge and technology is deployed that theory becomes useful. Early black powder artillery required an understanding of trigonometry and mathematics to employ; theory then becomes useful for the general as it can shortcut a mathematics degree.

Yeah. Not to mention he could always find someone else who knows the stuff and spend the time quaffing more wine.
 
Swadius said:
Onto the quote. You can't experience theory, people have to come up with them upon reflection, I doubt that anyone would have a theoretical epiphany in the midst of fighting for their own life. Knowing how to abstract what is happening in the data is important, and for a great part, it can be taught, the rest will rely on the talent and genius of the commander.
People have epiphanies at strange times, including while under duress. That's sort of why it's an epiphany.
 
gutsaxe said:
If the generals had actually been present in the trenches rather than miles behind in comfort, it wouldve been impossible to miss the futility of attacking. The Germans figured this out much sooner than the allies and as a result they lost less men
No they didn't, and it wouldn't have made a difference. They had no other means of taking a trench beyond throwing men at it and hoping for the best.

Plus a number of notable generals did indeed serve in the trenches.

Swadius said:
Hold on there, I actually think they must have been theorizing about that stuff to abstract the idea that what they were doing wasn't working. Direct experience won't teach you anything, you need a level of insight to come up with new tactics and strategies.
It was working, it just wasn't working very well. They ended up locked in a war of attrition because there was no other way to do it. If it wasn't for the invention of aircraft, WWII would have been fought exactly the same way.

Archonsod said:
Knowing how to abstract what is happening in the data is important, and for a great part, it can be taught, the rest will rely on the talent and genius of the commander.
Abstracting the data is as useful as reading accounts of ancient battles. No two engagements will ever play out the same way, there's a host of factors beyond the control of either general which influence a battle. All theory can tell you is why a battle was won or lost after the fact, and since the same battle will never be fought again, any lessons drawn have a limited application at best.
I don't think the type of experiences claimed in the OP would be all that insightful into the motives of your political opponent.
It's not the political motives the general needs to worry about, it's those which influence the battle such as the quality of leadership in the enemy, their morale or whether their troops can be relied on. All of which you learn by observing them in action.
Yes he did, but I think his success had more to do with his level of study of prior military greats than the experience he and others like him gained on the field.
He studied less than many of his officers, in fact he tended to write off past generals as irrelevant. Caesar was the only one he had time for, and then it was less about the battles and more about the politics.
And note Napoleon wasn't a particularly skilled general; most of the time when he took a direct hand in affairs the French lost. His real skill was in recognising ability and ensuring men with talent were promoted to positions they could best use it.
Horse + man = Man go faster, so what? If this is something the person has never used before, it's not going to help him very much about what he's going to do with it.
This is why you have the problem with experience vs theory; you need to use the cavalry first before you can start thinking about what works and what doesn't.
Yeah. Not to mention he could always find someone else who knows the stuff and spend the time quaffing more wine.
Not unless you're interested in selling your commission, no.
 
Archonsod said:
Not really. Theory is something that's not particularly useful until things like combined arms begin to make an appearance. Until then, it's simply a case of understanding how to ensure your troops are victorious which broadly speaking is something you can learn entirely from experience.

I'm going to step in with a point here.  Battlefield theory did exist, and needed to, before the modern era.  Whilst direct experience is always going to be important, you have to remember that without the theory, you may come away from a battle having learnt nothing except that you won or lost, with no clear idea of how.  Besides, combined arms existed from a very early time - trying to co-ordinate infantry and chariots, or archers and elephants, or whatever, is clearly "combined arms".  Cavalry have been doing their thing since whenever, and tactically, whilst the weapons have changed, their role hasn't, in the overall scheme of things, changed very much.

So my point is, without theory, it's harder to learn the lessons that your experience can teach you.  Without experience, it's harder to understand the theory's lessons.  So to the OP, experience is a "Good Thing (tm)"
 
cavalry roles did change significantly though,
originally there was much lighter cavalry, because the horses were much smaller; in the middle ages, the franks developed heavier cavalry and bred stronger horses. This led to the medieval knights who were shock cavalry.. Their roles were entirely different. The heavy cav. Were used for a frontal assault whilst the light cavalry skirmished and harassed the enemy.
One of the best examples of this is during the crusades , when the Muslim light cavalry just peeled away from the western knights.
Even as late as the napoleonic wars, the british horses were different from their french counterparts. (IIRC)
The experience gives a commander a much better idea of how his troops will react, having experienced it himself. But (getting back to the original point of the thread),  could they learn how to best utilize the troops available to them from military manuals and learning from their peers without having put their knowledge to use?
 
Obviously light cavalry and heavy cavalry are used differently.  As you've pointed out, they always have been.  Which is my point:  Light cavalry's role hasn't changed significantly - you can study Saladin's tactics and put some of the lessons to use with your troop of Marmon-Herringtons or Stuarts, if you've got the understanding of the differences between a horse and an armoured car or light tank and how that'll affect a WWII battlefield.  Experience of working with light armoured vehicles is important to take those lessons and *apply* them to the problem at hand.  So the answer to your re-wording of the original question is simply "no".  :smile:
 
Archonsod said:
gutsaxe said:
If the generals had actually been present in the trenches rather than miles behind in comfort, it wouldve been impossible to miss the futility of attacking. The Germans figured this out much sooner than the allies and as a result they lost less men
No they didn't, and it wouldn't have made a difference. They had no other means of taking a trench beyond throwing men at it and hoping for the best.

Plus a number of notable generals did indeed serve in the trenches.

Normally I agree with much of what you say Arch, but this one I don't.  There are three main reasons why I don't:

-The Germans built the Hindenburg Line because they learned from the disaster at Verdun in 1916.  All of 1917 was characterized by Germany on the defensive (with less overall casualties) in the west and behind excellently prepared trenches because...

-The Germans wanted to hold the Western Allies off until they could defeat the now collapsing Russia and free up numerous troops.  These of course would be used for a......

-Major concerted offensive in the west (the Spring Offensives of course).  However, before they were unleashed in combat, many were retrained in assault tactics as Sturmtruppen.  Although these units suffered heavy casualties, the Germans knew that they were effective.  They learned from the successes of these small assault units since their minor inception in 1915 with the Rohr Battalion, but now were going to use them in massive numbers.  As we all know, they probably had the greatest trench-breaking successes of the war too during 1918.
 
I am reminded of the initial battles of WWI. I dont remember the nations specifically, I think it was Aust-Hung vs Serbia. Anyway the defenders, disregarding what their experiences in war had taught them, decide to go with the new theory that artillery had gained supremacy in the arms race while the attackers still used the tried and true method of mounted infantry and marching lines. Needless to say, the theory was far more important than previous experience.

The great problem with experience is that it is always backward looking. Theory can predict the future, which is why I point out he following statement.

Archonsod said:
This is why you have the problem with experience vs theory; you need to use the cavalry first before you can start thinking about what works and what doesn't.
This sounds like you are generalizing your own limitations onto humanity as a whole. If it is a limitation for you, it is wise for you to work around it. However, that does not mean others are naive for trying it.

For instance, If you gave a crossbow to a random selection of Amazon natives who had never heard of a crossbow before, many would not know what to do with it. Others would have a vague idea what it is for. Still another group would intuitively know exactly what it is and merely be ignorant of the particulars of its function. A forth group would have the wrong idea of what it is.

Obviously, theory has enabled some to guess at what it is, how to use it, what to use it for. When the experimentation (read experience) stage begins, the people who had the best theory would need the least experience to operate it. Why? because theory is synthesized experience. They imagined what the crossbow could do and how and build their trial and errors to come on the assumptions they have crafted from these synthesized experiences.

Theory is not a set of rules one reads in a book taught in a school. Those are maxims, which are often oversimplified. Its merely a predicted outcome based on a set of assumption. This is why I support theory as the more important of the two. Its better for a general to be able to answer "what if' scenarios than to know what did and did not work in a past that may or may not be analogous to the present.
 
Skot the Sanguine said:
-Major concerted offensive in the west (the Spring Offensives of course).  However, before they were unleashed in combat, many were retrained in assault tactics as Sturmtruppen.  Although these units suffered heavy casualties, the Germans knew that they were effective. 
They weren't, they were useless. They had some successes in small parts of the line yes, but breaking trench warfare requires you overwhelm and push it back, not penetrate in small areas. All the storm troops effectively managed was to bleed Germany dry of experienced men.

Devercia said:
decide to go with the new theory that artillery had gained supremacy in the arms race
That was a theory of Napoleon. A hundred years before WW1.
This sounds like you are generalizing your own limitations onto humanity as a whole. If it is a limitation for you, it is wise for you to work around it. However, that does not mean others are naive for trying it.
Expecting such "blue sky" thinking to be exact to the real world is the very definition of naivety "having or showing a lack of experience, judgment, or information;", so you're pretty much wrong with that one. Now for bonus points think about why naivety has negative connotations.
For instance, If you gave a crossbow to a random selection of Amazon natives who had never heard of a crossbow before, many would not know what to do with it.
Most of them wouldn't accept and instead attempt to chase you off their territory.
Its merely a predicted outcome based on a set of assumption.
No, that's what we call "a guess".
 
Fun, is it not?

Archonsod said:
Devercia said:
decide to go with the new theory that artillery had gained supremacy in the arms race
That was a theory of Napoleon. A hundred years before WW1.
Even in Napoleon's day, you could weather a barrage of artillery to engage an army. In this case the whole army was unable to engage for want of being alive when they reached the enemy. The difference being the substantial increase in rate of fire. Experiencing that type of withering fire had not been done before. Of course using artillery to pin down the enemy is as old as archery, but that's not the point. It is not that the idea of doing so was new, it was the expectation of it being so effective that was the new theory.
This sounds like you are generalizing your own limitations onto humanity as a whole. If it is a limitation for you, it is wise for you to work around it. However, that does not mean others are naive for trying it.
Expecting such "blue sky" thinking to be exact to the real world is the very definition of naivety "having or showing a lack of experience, judgment, or information;", so you're pretty much wrong with that one. Now for bonus points think about why naivety has negative connotations.
No it is not, by your own definition, the 3 lacks are not guaranteed by past experience either, and thus one can be naive even with experience. That experience does not necessarily transfer to the topic at hand, and in this way a person can have experience, and still be lacking in it. Theory has a counterpart in this flaw by it being incomplete or wrongheaded, just as experience can ever be omniscient.

You are assuming that one must act on their assumptions, in this case theories, but the same is true of experience. It is just as naive to assume one's experience is relevant when it is not than to think one's theory is relevant, when it is not. It is just as much "blue sky" when one assumes what is to happen can be approached in the same way as what has already happened.  Both experience and theory can be misapplied, just as any tool can be misused. It is not wise to fault the hammer for the users' butterfingers.

Experience must be abstracted into new circumstances, and theory must be validated by reality, but remember, we are separating the two from each others complement, so to point out one's mutual weakness by the loss of the other is pointless.
For instance, If you gave a crossbow to a random selection of Amazon natives who had never heard of a crossbow before, many would not know what to do with it.
Most of them wouldn't accept and instead attempt to chase you off their territory.
...ok, I am assuming you are not going to refute the point of the illustration. Not that it is relevant, but I think it was Coronado that used a crossbow as a peace offering, and it was interpreted as a declaration of war.
Its merely a predicted outcome based on a set of assumption.
No, that's what we call "a guess".
And what is theory but an educated guess about the nature of a subject? (besides testing it with evidence, which would be experience. If you want to include this, it would mean theory includes, and therefor is superior to experience alone :razz:) However, I will clarify the statement by saying theory is the conceptual system by which one predicts that outcome, not the end, but the means so to speak.

I'd like to point out that I am supporting theory because AI think it is underrated by the average person. I also think experience has diminishing returns on its usefulness, while theory can branch out into other subjects, but has a substantial period of uselessness before it becomes applicable, even in its own subject. It is a threshold many do not have the patience to  breech. Of course, it is not better because somehow slower is better.
 
Devercia said:
Even in Napoleon's day, you could weather a barrage of artillery to engage an army.
You can today, it just doesn't tend to end well.
thus one can be naive even with experience.
Once again, the dictionary definition ""having or showing a lack of experience, judgment, or information;". Naivety is the opposite of experience, saying you can be naive with experience is like saying you can turn left and right at the same time.
That experience does not necessarily transfer to the topic at hand
Yes it does, otherwise you don't have any experience.
Both experience and theory can be misapplied, just as any tool can be misused.
In which case what you have is simply a bad general. The question is whether experience makes a better general, the implicit assumption there is that said general is competent in the first place.
...ok, I am assuming you are not going to refute the point of the illustration.
That was the refutation. You're theory is that Amazon tribes will respond one way when presented with a crossbow. As you point out, history (the actual experience) did not conform to the theory.
And what is theory but an educated guess about the nature of a subject?
That would be it's primary drawback, yes.
 
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