Why were they still using lancers in the Napoleonic era?

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BlindArcher

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I picture them getting shot to pieces a la The Charge of the Light Brigade.  Were they actually of any use or was it just a bunch of aristocrats trying to hang on to the romantic idea of a heroic charge?  At what point did Western armies generally recognize that the writing was on the wall for horse cavalry?  I realize this isn't related to medieval weaponry or tactics but I don't know where else to ask this.
 
Correct me if I'm wrong but weren't some of the lances in the medieval and renaissance eras basically just spears as well?  I think this is even how the use of lances started, i.e. some guy got the bright idea to use a spear on horseback and realized you could charge the enemy while holding it.
 
Same reason we use tanks and mobilised infantry today. They're faster than anything else on the field, and they're devastating to undisciplined troops. Plus there was little other option for relaying orders or scouting out the enemy.

There was little to counter them too. The Bayonet was only useful if used in number and in formation (the lance was far longer than the rifle). Artillery, assuming the crew stood their ground against a few hundred lancers bearing down on them, was too slow to reload and too innaccurate to really cause a problem for cavalry (terrain willing at least).

The Charge of the Light Brigade is a good example to be honest. They were light cavalry (unarmoured, on horses built for speed rather than stamina). For three quarters of a mile they sustained fire from riflemen and artillery from all sides, engaged heavy cavalry and returned in the same way (still taking fire) yet lost only 350 or so horses out of around 650 (and around 250 killed or captured men). Any infantry regiment in the same position would have been utterly destroyed within seconds.

Cavalry was still in widespread use during WW1, which is probably the end of it's era. Speed was still a great defence against rifles and artillery, but useless in the face of automatic fire from a machinegun. The static nature of trench warfare meant the cavalry were at a disadvantage (although IIRC the Poles used cavalry in WWII).

Mind you, you could argue that mechanised regiments are essentially the modern day equivilent of cavalry.
 
If I remember rightly Lancers were reintroduced during the Napoleonic wars. The lance had been abandonned everywhere in Europe, except Poland, in the early 17th century. Napoleon recruited several regiments of Polish lancers into his army, and everyone else, including the British, was rerally impressed by how effective they were a nd starting adopting lancer regiments as well.

I normally take anything on Wikipedia with a big pinch of salt, but they do seem to have summarised things fairly accurately though. Be wary of the details:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uhlan
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lancer
 
Archonsod said:
Cavalry was still in widespread use during WW1, which is probably the end of it's era. Speed was still a great defence against rifles and artillery, but useless in the face of automatic fire from a machinegun. The static nature of trench warfare meant the cavalry were at a disadvantage (although IIRC the Poles used cavalry in WWII).

Mostly, however, with the exception of the syrian campaign of WW1, where the light cavalry were used with great sucess. (mainly because of the shock of being charged, the turks simply forgot to adjust their sights for the range, the bullets flew over the heads of the cavalry.
 
Archonsod said:
The Charge of the Light Brigade is a good example to be honest. They were light cavalry (unarmoured, on horses built for speed rather than stamina). For three quarters of a mile they sustained fire from riflemen and artillery from all sides, engaged heavy cavalry and returned in the same way (still taking fire) yet lost only 350 or so horses out of around 650 (and around 250 killed or captured men). Any infantry regiment in the same position would have been utterly destroyed within seconds.
No heavy cav. You're confusing with the Charge of the Heavy Brigade, where massively outnumbered British heavy cav defeated the Russian heavy cav. The Light Brigade was supported by the French chasseurs d'Afrique on the way back, who neutralised the Russians on one side of them (don't remember which, and to lazy to open Cecil Woodham-Smith). But yes, despite the massive losses, the Light Brigade accomplished a mission that was suposedly impossible and which they had not actually been tasked with.

Aqtai: in this instance Wikipedia is incomplete. By the late 18th century, "Uhlans" was used generically to mean "lancers" by a number of armies. The Russians, for instance, refered to all regular lancers as Uhlans (see the Memoirs of Nadejda Durova, the only woman to serve in Russian armies until WWI and who spent almost all of her career in the Uhlans--first the Konnopolski Regiment, then the Lithuania Regiment), probably to mark their difference from the Cossacks, also lancers but not technically part of the regular army. The lance never wholly disapeared from European battlefields, although it did know a low point in the 17th century. Remember that pike warfare orientated most cavalry towards the caracolle tactics in the late 16th, and when the Swedes reminded everyone else that cavalry was most effective in a shock charge, they used swords rather than lances. However, the lance remained the primairy weapon of the Cossacks, as well as of the Polish 'winged hussars' and a number of light cavalry units also made use of it . The Uhlans themselves were more of an Austrian than a Polish creation, indeed the Napoleonic Polish Lancers suposedly only adopted the lance as their primairy weapon after the battle of Wagram, where they (reportedly) scavenged the lances of routed Austrian Uhlans.

To answer the original question:
Lances were used primairily (in the Napoleonic times) by light cavalry. The point of the lance was that it furnished the light cavalry with an effective shock weapon without sacrificing any of their mobility. The horses of the lancers and the rider's light build, also their absence of armour, were virtually the same as for the hussars (although the lance drills would probably build up more muscle than hussar training--see Durova's Memoirs for some tidbits on the daily life of Napoleonic light cav), yet the lance enabled them to effectively break the enemy square before having to collide with bayonets, so they could then use their sabres (light cavalry sabres, not the one found in Aqtai's signature) on already disorganised infantry. The lance (or pike) also gave them an advantage in a frontal charge against opposing light cav. However, the lancers neglected some aspects of skirmishing the hussars were trained in, most notably use of the rifled carbine to haras the enemy at range. Nevertheless, both types of light cav were largely suited for the same types of reconnaissance, patrol, diversion and screening missions, although the lancers were more effective in pitched battles due to their more effective charge; consequently, they were less highly specialised in the light cavalry's support duties than the hussars as they had to devote more time to training for charging with couched lance. Note that most of the details come from Nadejda Durova and that, while her anecdotes provide real information, her purpose was not to describe in detail the tactical strengths and weaknesses of her arm, and may not be wholly accurate for armies other than Russia's.

More generally, you seem to be under some misundertsandings as to the nature of warfare in the Napoleonic era. The writing was not on the wall for the cavalry charge and would not be until the invention of the Maxim-gun. You seem to think that infantry fire was considerably more effective than it truly was; indeed, the primairy weapon of infantry in this era was the bayonet, their secondary weapon the infantry sabre, the musket being used as a support weapon--its main strength was that the same soldiers could be both the primairy shock force and their wown ranged support, softening up the enemy with repeated musket volleys as they closed before the decisive charge. In fact, the musket was a very poor weapon, due largely to its abysmal accuracy. To fully underscore just how bad this was, I have to relate part of Jean-Roch Coignet's memoirs; during the fighting in Poland in 1807, he and other grenadiers of Napoleon's Old Guard--bear in mind that these are crack troops, the best in the world at that time--go hunting (the French army is enar starvation). They manage to creep up on a herd of deer and several hares, but, to quote the man himself, "with our standard-issue muskets [fusils de munition], loaded with balls, every shot missed", even at close range on an immobile target the size of a deer. For this very reason, most armies did not even teach their recruits how to aim the things, they were just drilled in reloading them fast and firing together in the general direction of the foe. Only volleys fired at point-blank range could inflict any serious losses.

As for the bayonet, it was a much more offensive weapon that the pike, the main reason the British at first did not want to adopt it. In the end they were forced to, since Highlanders with swords had no trouble dealing with pikemen; but that is another story. Archonsod correctly pointed out its lack of reached, compared to the pike or lance, which reduced its effectiveness in defending against a cavalry charge. Contrary to popular belief, the square defensive formations did not allow infantry to withstand a cavalry attack. Their main purpose was that, with each battalion forming a separate square, the enemy would be forced to either split his forces without being able to effectively flank any unit, or else to concentrate on only a few units, in which case he would be exposed to a crossfire, which would be just as deadly to the infantry under attack as to the attackers; but in this era of mass conscription, a few battalions of the Line were expendable. The other main strength of the square formation was that it was an adaptable tactial formation, much like the Roman manipulum, which allowed the sqaure to manoeuvre rapidly over any terrain and rapidly react to a threat from any side. However, cavalry could, and did, break the squares, for instance at the battles of Eylau (1806), Hanau (1813), and Waterlo (1815); in the later, it took the intervention (and sacrifice) of much of Wellington's cavalry to halt the French cavalry.



 
Horrendous casualties for the infantry, I hope you mean? The French lost the entire Fourteenth of the Line at Eylau, to a cavalry attack. The regiment was buried by order of rank, the newest private at the bottom and the colonel on top. Compared to a pike block the squares were child's play to break, especially if friendly artillery could loosen the formation somewhat. At Hanau, the French used their cavalry to break the Bavarian's formation("make them open ranks"), so that the French infantry (two battalions against the entire Bavarian army) could encountered less resistance. Of course, de Wrede made things easyer for the French by not bringing his entire force to bear simultaneously, so that many Bavarians routed without having taken an active part in the battle. But the fact remains that the cavalry were used to break the squares, that was what they excelled at.
 
Cirdan said:
No heavy cav. You're confusing with the Charge of the Heavy Brigade, where massively outnumbered British heavy cav defeated the Russian heavy cav.
No, the remnants of the Russian heavy cavalry had retreated behind the Russian guns to regroup. When the Light Brigade charge reached the Russian position, the remnants of the Russian heavy cavalry engaged and drove them off (though not before the guns had been spiked). 
Their main purpose was that, with each battalion forming a separate square, the enemy would be forced to either split his forces without being able to effectively flank any unit, or else to concentrate on only a few units, in which case he would be exposed to a crossfire, which would be just as deadly to the infantry under attack as to the attackers;
Actually the square took advantage of the horse's psychology. The horse would refuse to charge through the middle of a mass of men, especially if they were holding out their rifles (the horse would basically see an incredibly thick wall). This prevented the cavalry from charging through the formation, forcing them to stand and fight.
Your correct that squares weren't necessarily invulnerable. The battle became a straight forward toe to toe fight, and while the infantry had the greater number, experience and equipment was usually on the side of the cavalry. By far the greater danger was the cavalry becoming locked into the combat, as they'd usually be in a position where the enemy could throw more troops (or even his own cavalry) into the fight before their own side could relieve them.

Yes, cavalry could break square, but everything I've read implies that doing so required either a poorly trained square, luck, or horrendous casualties and determination.
In most cases it was down to numbers. Sufficient number of cavalry would easily defeat a square (like I said, they had experience, training and equipment on their side, while the infantry usually had the numerical advantage).
To take Waterloo as an example, the French cavalry would likely have overwhelmed and collapsed Nelson's squares quite easily. However, due to the terrain (uphill and muddy) combined with incompetant commanders, the cavalry arrived piecemeal. You could argue that the squares were actually a poor formation to have adopted - forming up in line would have reduced the effect of the French artillery, while allowing more than enough firepower (and if it came to it, manpower) to see off the small groups of Cavalry as they arrived.

But the fact remains that the cavalry were used to break the squares, that was what they excelled at
Not really. The main use of cavalry was to force the enemy to adopt square formation in the first place, especially under Napoleon. Not only was a static square an ideal target for artillery, but it reduced the firepower the infantry could bring to bear on the large French columns he tended to favour.
 
Merentha said:
Again, I haven't studied the Napoleonic era that well, but I thought the general idea was for cavalry to threaten infantry, forcing them into squares so the artillery could take easier shots.

If I remember rightly the square was a useful tactic in places like in the Sudan war and it probabley would of worked in the Zulu wars to in rokes drift
 
Archonsod said:
No, the remnants of the Russian heavy cavalry had retreated behind the Russian guns to regroup. When the Light Brigade charge reached the Russian position, the remnants of the Russian heavy cavalry engaged and drove them off (though not before the guns had been spiked). 
I've got no idea where that comes from, but Woodham-Smith--who spent years of research and goes into great detail, summarising the accounts of numerous members of the Light Brigade--does not (IIRC--it's been a few years and I'm to lazy to look it up right now, will probably do so later) mention any combat occurring between the Russian heavies and the Light Brigade, so I am disinclined to believe you.
Actually the square took advantage of the horse's psychology. The horse would refuse to charge through the middle of a mass of men, especially if they were holding out their rifles (the horse would basically see an incredibly thick wall). This prevented the cavalry from charging through the formation, forcing them to stand and fight.
Your correct that squares weren't necessarily invulnerable. The battle became a straight forward toe to toe fight, and while the infantry had the greater number, experience and equipment was usually on the side of the cavalry. By far the greater danger was the cavalry becoming locked into the combat, as they'd usually be in a position where the enemy could throw more troops (or even his own cavalry) into the fight before their own side could relieve them.
Now, the horse is fearful of walls and stepping on people by nature, but it can be trained to ride down opponents. The thick mass of men is no different from what cavalry faced in other eras (ironically, if cavalry came to a standstill right in front of pike blocks they'd probably fare better than they actually do), and in Napoleon's time (as before) the horses, provided they were properly trained, could ride straight through the enemy formation. Again, see Eylau, where the French cavalry rode through the Russian infantry, reached and silenced the Russian guns, and then rode back through the Russian infantry. Whatever the Russians were doing it obviously was not very effective at stopping cavalry.

To be fair, your assessment sounds alot like what happened to the British heavy cav at Waterloo--except that the Brits rode through the French infantry, but rather than turning back and re-forming as they were supposed to, carried on forwards until they reached the French artillery. Unlike Murat at Eylau, they found themselves rapidly encircled and counter-attacked. it is a universal law that cavalry assaulted at a standstill gets cut to pieces, regardless of place and period.

Not really. The main use of cavalry was to force the enemy to adopt square formation in the first place, especially under Napoleon. Not only was a static square an ideal target for artillery, but it reduced the firepower the infantry could bring to bear on the large French columns he tended to favour.
The square couldn't really be adopted in a hurry, for obvious reasons. Thus the battalions moved as squares (such as at the Battle of the Pyramids--but the Mamlukes lacked the discipline and tight formations of European cavalry), or formed their squares well in advance. When the cavalry came forward to charge them, it was already to late to do so in most cases. At Waterloo, the Brunnswickian and Hanoverian troops sent to relieve La Haye-Sainte were marching in squares (and were annihilated by the French cuirassiers); the English defending Mont-Saint-Jean were placed in twenty squares on the far side of the slope, safe from French artillery, and forcing the cuirassiers sent to assault them (already far from fresh, as they were the same that had previously charged near La Haye-Sainte and then suffered from the British counterattack) to ride all the way up the hill and then regroup before charging; moreover, they were disposed with artillery support, which was decisive in resisting the French charges. Indeed, the best--and usually, the only--chance a square had of resisting a cavalry charge lay in artillery support combined with a final volley fired at point-blank range; if the cavalry wavered and broke its formation before hitting the infantry, it would be defeated.

jlgx50: the squares worked best against undisciplined cavalry like the Mamlukes, which lacked the impact inherent to the tight, stirrup to stirrup, formations of European cavalry, and more likely to break up even further when exposed to a crossfire.
 
I've got no idea where that comes from, but Woodham-Smith--who spent years of research and goes into great detail, summarising the accounts of numerous members of the Light Brigade--does not (IIRC--it's been a few years and I'm to lazy to look it up right now, will probably do so later) mention any combat occuring between the Russian heavies and the Light Brigade, so I am disinclined to believe you.

After the charge of the heavy brigade the remaining Russian cavalry retreated behind an 8 gun battery at the end of the North Valley. During the charge of the light brigade, both the left squadron of the 17th Lancers and the 11th Hussars bypassed the Russian guns and smashed into the Russian cavalry. The 11th Hussars actually broke and pursued the Russians as far as the aqueduct, before being driven off by a force of Cossacks and fresh Russian cavalry who moved towards the battle from the Fedouikine hills. Russian Cavalry pouring into the valley from the Redoubts on the Causeway heights also opposed the light brigade as it made it's way back along the valley, though these were dispersed.

You can clearly see the position of the Russian heavy cavalry on this map (took from britishbattles.com)
map.gif



Now, the horse is fearful of walls and stepping on people by nature, but it can be trained to ride down opponents.
They can't be trained to run into a wall though, especially not one of spikes.
it is a universal law that cavalry assaulted at a standstill gets cut to pieces, regardless of place and period.
Yes, and that was the purpose of the square - to force the cavalry to come to a standstill

The square couldn't really be adopted in a hurry, for obvious reasons.
Depended on the troops to be honest. I believe two minutes was quoted as the record. For recruits or poorly disciplined troops then it would take longer, but by the end of the Napoleonic war you had men who'd been fighting for nearly three decades, not rookies by any means.
Thus the battalions moved as squares (such as at the Battle of the Pyramids--but the Mamlukes lacked the discipline and tight formations of European cavalry), or formed their squares well in advance.
They would usually remain in square, only forming line if it was useful to do so. As long as the enemy had cavalry on the field, then the infantry would stick to square. When we say 'threaten with cavalry' then it translates to Napoleon simply making it visible that he has unengaged cavalry on the field and in a position to move against the infantry. Infantry would usually only deploy into line (or extended line for the British) if they were expected to defend a wide front (or wished to bring maximum firepower against a target to the front).

if the cavalry wavered and broke its formation before hitting the infantry, it would be defeated.
The point of the square was to break the cavalry formation. It's impossible to ride directly through a square of infantry unless you can first reduce the number of men on one side (or they break). The only way cavalry could attack a square was by clipping the edge. The horses would simply stop if asked to charge into the middle, causing the cavalry to fight at a standstill (where the superior number of infantry would likely decide the matter).

 
Archonsod said:
After the charge of the heavy brigade the remaining Russian cavalry retreated behind an 8 gun battery at the end of the North Valley. During the charge of the light brigade, both the left squadron of the 17th Lancers and the 11th Hussars bypassed the Russian guns and smashed into the Russian cavalry. The 11th Hussars actually broke and pursued the Russians as far as the aqueduct, before being driven off by a force of Cossacks and fresh Russian cavalry who moved towards the battle from the Fedouikine hills. Russian Cavalry pouring into the valley from the Redoubts on the Causeway heights also opposed the light brigade as it made it's way back along the valley, though these were dispersed.
You've forced me to reopen The Reason Why...according to Woodham-Smith, drawing on the accounts of the Light Brigade's officers, the Russian heavy cav was massed a few hundred yards further away, and "displayed the same bewilderment and hesitation as when it advanced on the Heavy Brigade in the morning" , not actually charging or playing any role other than that of a menacing presence. The 11th Hussars and elements of the 17th lancers (it would incorrect to term twenty men, out of a regiment reduced to thirty-seven, a squadron) did indeed engage lancers (i.e. Uhlans or Cossacks), and the Russians received the charge at a standstill and were routed. Another body of Russians, still lancers, attempted to cut off the retreat of the light brigade, but their commander never decided himself to charge, and worse, when the survivors, led by Colonel Shrewell, rode at him he moved out of their way to the right, so they only had to fed off a few lance-thrusts as they passed. They then attempted to harass the retreating British, many of which were now on foot, but were soon driven off by their own side's fire, coming from the Causeway Heights. Lord Cardigan also had a skirmish against a few Cossacks because Prince Radziwill (an acquaintance of his) had recognised him and watned him alive; this meant the Cossacks, although ganging up on the lone Lord, were not allowed to cut him down and he managed to fight his way free. So, the Russian heavy cavalry did not engage the Light Brigade (according to Woodham-Smith).


They can't be trained to run into a wall though, especially not one of spikes.
Obviously, they can, or else you'd never get them to actually charge anything but skirmishers. Also, since i've now had to go over the charge of the Light Brigade again, I'll draw your attention to the thick clouds of smoke which prevented the men from seeing the guns they were charging at. There's no guarantee the horse would actually see the infantry it was charging into, and besides, if it did stop it would certainly be killed due to the hundreds of horses galloping behind it, practically with their noses against its rump and not seeing what it saw.


Yes, and that was the purpose of the square - to force the cavalry to come to a standstill
Obviously, though the same can be said for pike-blocks, Macedonian phalanxes, etc. Of course, it was far from always succeeding in this.

Depended on the troops to be honest. I believe two minutes was quoted as the record. For recruits or poorly disciplined troops then it would take longer, but by the end of the Napoleonic war you had men who'd been fighting for nearly three decades, not rookies by any means.
Most of the troops were "rookies"--casualty rates were high, line infantry being considered expendable. Most of the allied troops at Waterloo were fresh conscripts, with a few units of veterans thrown in. The French had more experienced troops, but less numbers overall and of course poor morale throughout the entire campaign, Napoleon's first abdication having destroyed his cult of the personnality.
They would usually remain in square, only forming line if it was useful to do so. As long as the enemy had cavalry on the field, then the infantry would stick to square. When we say 'threaten with cavalry' then it translates to Napoleon simply making it visible that he has unengaged cavalry on the field and in a position to move against the infantry. Infantry would usually only deploy into line (or extended line for the British) if they were expected to defend a wide front (or wished to bring maximum firepower against a target to the front).
Columns for the assault, you forget the columns! They were successful because they were so much more efficient that the classic prussian infantry model, remaining in a line throughout. Remember that the musket had a terribly short effective range, greatly limiting the firepower that could be brought to bear on the attacking column's head. The rifle changed this, of course--with every shot being aimed and remaining accurate at range, the infantry's effective firepower was increased to the point where they could rout charging columns with fire. This happened at the Alma, thirty-nine years after the end of the Napoleonic wars.


The point of the square was to break the cavalry formation. It's impossible to ride directly through a square of infantry unless you can first reduce the number of men on one side (or they break). The only way cavalry could attack a square was by clipping the edge. The horses would simply stop if asked to charge into the middle, causing the cavalry to fight at a standstill (where the superior number of infantry would likely decide the matter).
Again, the horse could be made to charge on into the middle of the square. It was also, of course, standard practice to use artillery to weaken the square beforehand, so that it would be broken more easily; but in any case, provided the cavalry kept a tight formation then the sheer weight of several hundred big, heavy horses, mounted by cuirassiers (big and heavy, for the times at least--nowadays we'd consider the "giant" grenadiers of the era quite small), hitting the same point in the line while remaining in a compact mass would break any formation, possibly at the cost of the lead riders. Of course, remaining in a compact wedge while galloping ful tilt towards the enemy, in the last part of a charge, was not the easiest exercice one can imagine, especially if you have to fill gaps in your ranks as you go.
 
Cirdan said:
So, the Russian heavy cavalry did not engage the Light Brigade (according to Woodham-Smith).
They never charged them, but then given that they'd been battered already by the heavy brigade it's not surprising. Whether or not they charged is irrelevant though, otherwise you might as well say the Charge of the Heavy Brigade never happened. Indeed, given the absolute inferiority of the Russian cavalry you'd have just as much grounds for claiming they never fought in the battle.
Obviously, they can, or else you'd never get them to actually charge anything but skirmishers.
The horse isn't stupid. It knows it can push through (or over) a few men. The trick of the square formation is that the horse is unaware of the gap in the middle, as far as it's concerned it's being asked to run straight into a tightly packed, solid group. If you can imagine a square from the horses eyes, it would look like the entire area was a solid mass. From the horses point of view, if it can't see the ground behind the men then it doesn't exist, as far as it's concerned your asking it to run into an infinite mass of solid objects (with spikes. And loud noises).
There's no guarantee the horse would actually see the infantry it was charging into, and besides, if it did stop it would certainly be killed due to the hundreds of horses galloping behind it, practically with their noses against its rump and not seeing what it saw.
Collisions between horses are rarely fatal, at least for the horses. The horse would either try to stop or move around the blockage, either way the rider isn't in the best position to fight. That's assuming the horse is surprised, which given that their sense of smell, hearing and sight is better than ours is not necessarily a given. The horse would likely attempt to stop or turn, possibly throwing the rider if he wasn't prepared for it.
The thing is, there would be no sense or reason for the cavalry to aim for the centre of the formation. If they're facing a line, then it makes perfect sense to break through and turn to attack the rear of the formation. Against a square (which has no rear) then your best bet is to aim for the corner and strike diagnolly. Although this would expose you to fire from two sides of the square, you stand a good chance of isolating part of the formation (assuming the rest of the formation held. Otherwise they'd break formation and the point would be moot).
Obviously, though the same can be said for pike-blocks, Macedonian phalanxes, etc. Of course, it was far from always succeeding in this.
They followed the same principal. The only real benefit the square had over the earlier formations was the use of ranged weapons, allowing the infantry to attack despite not moving (and negate the reach of a lance somewhat). Part of the drill for the square was to fire at the cavalry as they moved around the sides - in ideal conditions, each man would be able to fire a shot at the cavalry, either as they charged or as they passed around the square.
Most of the troops were "rookies"--casualty rates were high, line infantry being considered expendable.
Not at all. When an infantry formation is numbered by the thousand you need to take at least seven hundred casualties before it becomes high. Most soldiers in the British army were career soldiers (largely because there was little else they could do if they left the army). By Waterloo there were several conscript regiments (due to fresh recruitment to deal with Napoleon's comeback) but Wellington was smart enough to keep them from the main part of the fighting. Few of the officers commanding the regiments would have been recruits, and in many ways it was on the officers in charge that the battle was decided (or in the case of Waterloo, inexplicable attacks of idiocy affecting the officers which decided the battle)
Columns for the assault, you forget the columns! They were successful because they were so much more efficient that the classic prussian infantry model, remaining in a line throughout. Remember that the musket had a terribly short effective range, greatly limiting the firepower that could be brought to bear on the attacking column's head.
Columns for assault tended to be Napoleons thing - the British preferred to advance in line whenever possible. The firepower of the musket was still formidable from a line into a column though - with a few thousand men grouped together in a single mass actually missing something would be the tricky part. The problem with the column was that it was all or nothing though - either the men would stick together, advance and overwhelm the enemy, or else they'd break and run under the guns of the enemy.
They were something of a gamble either way. The column couldn't usually stop to fire, and with the smoke clouds drifting across the battlefield you're hoping they won't emerge from the smoke bank to find every gun in the enemy army aimed at them. Saying that, several times the mere approach of the column was enough to break the enemy and send him running.
It was another purpose of forcing the enemy into square though. It reduced the firepower directed at the columns by a quarter. Needless to say, columns had no problem smashing through the centre of a square.
The rifle changed this, of course--with every shot being aimed and remaining accurate at range, the infantry's effective firepower was increased to the point where they could rout charging columns with fire. This happened at the Alma, thirty-nine years after the end of the Napoleonic wars.
The British had a significant number of rifles during the Napoleonic wars. France too could have fielded plenty, but Napoleon dismissed them for his own reasons. Barring Russian winters, if he had chose to field them in any large amount I have no doubt he would have won the war.
Again, the horse could be made to charge on into the middle of the square.
Not if the square held firm and contained significant men. The horse would only charge through the square if it thought it could either muscle or run through the men. You'd need either a fairly large gap in the centre(one the horse could see), or else a pretty small square in order for that to happen. Otherwise the horse would consider it a solid, single mass.

 
Archonsod said:
They never charged them, but then given that they'd been battered already by the heavy brigade it's not surprising. Whether or not they charged is irrelevant though, otherwise you might as well say the Charge of the Heavy Brigade never happened. Indeed, given the absolute inferiority of the Russian cavalry you'd have just as much grounds for claiming they never fought in the battle.
[/quote
But the Light Brigade didn't charge them either, unlike the Heavy Brigade.

The horse isn't stupid. It knows it can push through (or over) a few men. The trick of the square formation is that the horse is unaware of the gap in the middle, as far as it's concerned it's being asked to run straight into a tightly packed, solid group. If you can imagine a square from the horses eyes, it would look like the entire area was a solid mass. From the horses point of view, if it can't see the ground behind the men then it doesn't exist, as far as it's concerned your asking it to run into an infinite mass of solid objects (with spikes. And loud noises)..

Collisions between horses are rarely fatal, at least for the horses. The horse would either try to stop or move around the blockage, either way the rider isn't in the best position to fight. That's assuming the horse is surprised, which given that their sense of smell, hearing and sight is better than ours is not necessarily a given. The horse would likely attempt to stop or turn, possibly throwing the rider if he wasn't prepared for it.
The thing is, there would be no sense or reason for the cavalry to aim for the centre of the formation. If they're facing a line, then it makes perfect sense to break through and turn to attack the rear of the formation. Against a square (which has no rear) then your best bet is to aim for the corner and strike diagnolly. Although this would expose you to fire from two sides of the square, you stand a good chance of isolating part of the formation (assuming the rest of the formation held. Otherwise they'd break formation and the point would be moot).
Charging the middle of a square is little different from charging a line. You're effectively charging a line three to six ranks deeps (although more than four would be highly unusual), with another behind it (and most of the time facing away from you, so if you break the first you're in their rear) and two others at the ends, facing away from the middle. In the centre you've got such 'soft spots' as officers, drums, standard bearers, and sometimes cannons or howitcers--all of which are prime cavalry-fodder.

As for charging diagonally to attack the corners, I have come to the conclusion that this was more what the infantry commander hoped for than the "best bet" of the cavalry. Certainly at the Battle of the Pyramids, the Mamluke cavalry excuted such an attack, with disastrous concequences for themselves and virtually no impact on the infantry. Most of the (very light) casualties the French suffered in that battle were due to the Turkish artillery supporting the Mamlukes. It appears the Prussians attempted the same at Auerstaedt (14th October 1806, simultaneously to Iena), again with disastrous consequences for Blücher's cavalry but without breaking the squares. Not only would cavalry executing such a manoeuvre expose itself to the point-blank volleys of two of the square's sides, but also to a crossfire from neighbouring squares; moreover, at the Pyramids and in some other engagements, cannons were placed at the corners of the squares, and could enfilade passing cavalry with grape-shot. On the other hand, at Eylau both French and Russian cavalry, without worrying about such nonsense, charged the squares frontally, broke them and mercilessly cut down the routing infantry. I have already brought up the case of the French 14th of the Line, which, according to Coignet at least, was exterminated to the last man. Also, note that at Borodino, the French cavalry not only charged squares, but redoubts--'Bagration's fleches'--with considerable success.




Not at all. When an infantry formation is numbered by the thousand you need to take at least seven hundred casualties before it becomes high. Most soldiers in the British army were career soldiers (largely because there was little else they could do if they left the army). By Waterloo there were several conscript regiments (due to fresh recruitment to deal with Napoleon's comeback) but Wellington was smart enough to keep them from the main part of the fighting. Few of the officers commanding the regiments would have been recruits, and in many ways it was on the officers in charge that the battle was decided (or in the case of Waterloo, inexplicable attacks of idiocy affecting the officers which decided the battle)
Ah, but the casualties were in the hundreds and thousands. Line infantry was considered expendable by its commanders, and as such, often found itself being sacrificed. Casualty rates could easily reach twenty percent for the victorious army, and more than twice that for the losers. At Waterloo, Wellington had a few units of veterans--notably Picton's brigade--but he himself called his army "an infamous army, weak and ill-equipped, with inexperienced staff". That quote is brought up in so many works concerning Waterloo, that I'm surprised you didn't have it in mind.


Columns for assault tended to be Napoleons thing - the British preferred to advance in line whenever possible. The firepower of the musket was still formidable from a line into a column though - with a few thousand men grouped together in a single mass actually missing something would be the tricky part. The problem with the column was that it was all or nothing though - either the men would stick together, advance and overwhelm the enemy, or else they'd break and run under the guns of the enemy.
They were something of a gamble either way. The column couldn't usually stop to fire, and with the smoke clouds drifting across the battlefield you're hoping they won't emerge from the smoke bank to find every gun in the enemy army aimed at them. Saying that, several times the mere approach of the column was enough to break the enemy and send him running.
It was another purpose of forcing the enemy into square though. It reduced the firepower directed at the columns by a quarter. Needless to say, columns had no problem smashing through the centre of a square.
Not Napoleon's trade-mark by any means. Suvorov was in love with columns well before the French Revolution, and every European country used them, except the British.

The British had a significant number of rifles during the Napoleonic wars. France too could have fielded plenty, but Napoleon dismissed them for his own reasons. Barring Russian winters, if he had chose to field them in any large amount I have no doubt he would have won the war.
The Baker rifle, produced starting in 1800, did not replace the Brown Bess. It was used by specialised rifle regiments, whose particularity was that they would mass in firing lines and open fire in volleys, whereas the other European powers gave rifles only to skirmishers. While British rifle regiments did contribute considerable firepower, their overall effectiveness is debatable and they should not be confused with mid-19th century riflemen, whose weapons were impossible to produce with the metallurgical knowledge in existence during the Napoleonic wars. The Baker rifle went out of use more than twenty years prior to the Alma.

Not if the square held firm and contained significant men. The horse would only charge through the square if it thought it could either muscle or run through the men. You'd need either a fairly large gap in the centre(one the horse could see), or else a pretty small square in order for that to happen. Otherwise the horse would consider it a solid, single mass.
The squares are hollow, remember? as for creating gaps, cavalry should be supported by artillery, and a cannonball will take down an entire file of men. Hussars with carbines and skirmishers could also be used to support the heavy cav, and some cavalry types would discharge firearms at the enemy before the impact. All of this made it quite hard to keep a square presenting a perfectly compact front.
 
Cirdan said:
But the Light Brigade didn't charge them either, unlike the Heavy Brigade.
The 11th Hussars and 17th Lancers were part of the Light Brigade. Indeed the majority of the 17th joined the attack on the Russian guns, it was only a small squadron on the flank which followed the Hussars. God knows why.
Charging the middle of a square is little different from charging a line. You're effectively charging a line three to six ranks deeps (although more than four would be highly unusual), with another behind it (and most of the time facing away from you, so if you break the first you're in their rear) and two others at the ends, facing away from the middle. In the centre you've got such 'soft spots' as officers, drums, standard bearers, and sometimes cannons or howitcers--all of which are prime cavalry-fodder.
It's the perception which alters. Charging a line the horse can see there's only three or four men in front of it, and relatively open ground behind. With a square, it sees enough men to blot out the open ground behind and as a result treats it as an impassable obstacle. In addition, the men are more tightly packed than a line and usually would have their muskets presented over or through the rank in front, so there's no large gaps visible that the horse could push through.
As for charging diagonally to attack the corners, I have come to the conclusion that this was more what the infantry commander hoped for than the "best bet" of the cavalry.
It would depend on the quality of the troops and the positioning. The idea is to isolate part of the regiment and either defeat or scatter it, before wheeling around to do it again. The cavalry will come under fire, it's a question of who's nerve would give first. Mainly the intent is to neutralise the infantry numerical advantage.
Of course nothing can really be taken as a given. Balaclava also gave us the Thin Red Line which pretty much went against the general wisdom of cavalry being devestating to infantry formed in line.
Not only would cavalry executing such a manoeuvre expose itself to the point-blank volleys of two of the square's sides, but also to a crossfire from neighbouring squares;
One would hope you'd have enough cavalry to keep the other squares occupied. You do come under fire from two sides, but by that count it's better than engaging a line (where the entire regiment could fire).
Also, note that at Borodino, the French cavalry not only charged squares, but redoubts--'Bagration's fleches'--with considerable success.
Redoubts are a different matter altogether. Russian cavalry was instrumental in clearing the allied redoubts at Balaclava too. Redoubts seem particularly vulnerable to cavalry to be honest; usually it's breastworks, trenches and similar obstacles easily jumped by a horse, plus the men manning the redoubt are already split up into small groups (at least in most cases).
Ah, but the casualties were in the hundreds and thousands.
As a total, rarely from a single regiment. If Napoleon could have inflicted hundreds and thousands of casualties on each British regiment he'd have depopulated Britain in a year.
That quote is brought up in so many works concerning Waterloo, that I'm surprised you didn't have it in mind.
I always took it to be directed mainly at the allied contingents to be honest. Especially the Netherland contingent. Mind you, he was a cynical old bugger at the best of times.
Not Napoleon's trade-mark by any means. Suvorov was in love with columns well before the French Revolution, and every European country used them, except the British.
If I recall correctly it was the fact that Napoleon sent pretty much his entire infantry contingent forward in two or three massive columns that set him apart. Most other armies preferred to keep one or two regiments back for cover.
While British rifle regiments did contribute considerable firepower, their overall effectiveness is debatable
It was more psychological than anything else. The French knew they were accurate weapons, to the point where they actually overestimate their capabilities. Probably particularly galling to the officers, since they'd be aware that a single man aiming a shot could put an end to their career. They also had a longer effective range than the musket, which in itself is a huge advantage.
The squares are hollow, remember?
The point being the horse needs to be able to see that. Their eye's (especially at a gallop) aren't that much higher than a humans, and they don't face forwards. The horse would be seeing the square through near enough peripheral vision, at a point perhaps three or four inches higher than a man. Without a fair size gap between the sides then the rear side will blend in to the facing side, and a horse's thought processes don't really allow it to figure out there's a gap there.
 
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