worst strategic decision / mistake

[Lueii]

  Hannibal Barca not attacking Rome.....yes it would have been almost impossible to take....yes he wasn't suited for siege tatics.  And yes the romans would have gathered tens of thousands to hold it and the defenders would out-number him....but if anyone could do it he could.

  It's not the worst because it was stupid....the worst part was he had sacrificed tens of thousands lives to get into italy and win his battle for the reason of taking Rome.  And he never even tried...

  Even if he failed, Rome would have been paralyzed for years, and provided some security for the home he was claiming to defend by attacking the peninsula.  By leaving he undid all his progress and regained none of the valuble soldiers he lost.  He also simply created a new generation of vengeful, brillant aristocrats that in a few hundred years utterly annilated his city....

Hm, why do you think the goal of his campaign was to take Rome? If it was, wouldn't he have brought more siege equipment and actually undertaken a siege? I would guess he hoped to break most of the alliances Rome had with other Italic states, beat them in some battles, and make a peace treaty benefiting Carthage. Sure, taking Rome would have been neat for Hannibal, but I don't see any particular reason he would consider it necessary.

  There was no way or reason to bring siege equipment over the alps....especially when they could just build some there.  Ending Rome was the only way to really end the war and he didn't do that.

.....

  By tens of thousands I was including the Romans as well.  No matter what the actual size of the armies they could easily be in the tens of thousands of casualties.  A strategist like Hannibal knew how to win wars.  Rome after Cannae was defenseless for days.  He could have easily finished them there.  He should have known from experience that negotiating with Rome is as silly as accepting gifts from Greeks.  Mercy to the Romans was in effect him dealing the deathstroke to the Carthaginian Empire.  The aristocrat that would destroy the Empire was the son of the roman general beaten in Hannibal's first battle, Scipio Africanus.  If he had even attacked Rome and failed, he could have killed hundreds of the aristocrats that Rome depended on.

[Olafhelmsborg]

By tens of thousands I was including the Romans as well.  No matter what the actual size of the armies they could easily be in the tens of thousands of casualties.  A strategist like Hannibal knew how to win wars.  Rome after Cannae was defenseless for days.

Hannibal was three weeks march away from Rome. Rome itself had Two city legions, 1500 men under Marcellus at Ostia, the legion of marines at Teanum Sidicinum, Postumius' two legions and allies in Cisalpine Gaul, and the armies in Sicily and Sardinia which could have been transferred across to Rome by sea before Hannibal's arrival. 8,000 slave volunteers and 6,000 criminals were quickly raised and armed with foreign armour and weapons from past triumphs to bolster the defences, not to mention the civilian population of Rome itself which would have also defended itself - had Hannibal somehow managed to get into the city, it has been argued by Strauss and Ober (The Anatomy of Error: Ancient Military Disasters and their lessons for Modern Strategists, 1992, p.154-5) that his army could have become involved in vicious street fighting which would have made it far from certain Hannibal could keep a hold on the city (especially considering that Hannibal would have arrived there with at most 25,000 men). Rome was far from undefended. Had they known they had nobody to defend themselves, why dismiss Cartharlo without even admitting him into the city to discuss peace - apparently Hannibal's terms were moderate? To suggest they would have capitulated at the sight of Hannibal's army is unknowable - but given the information I've read, I'm more inclined to believe they would have defended their city to the death. Livy's words on the plight of Rome are rhetorical exaggerations, Rome had men to defend it's walls.

[Lueii]

1500 Legionares + 14,000 Levies + untrained populace is of Rome isn't very useful against a man who has destroyed several legions, and a hardened army of 25,000 men.

I think they would fought to the end...but they would have lost so many people and have so few good replacements for their fallen they couldn't have held back Hannibal and even if they did it would be decades before they regained their cities influence and power.

[Olafhelmsborg]

1500 Legionares + 14,000 Levies + untrained populace is of Rome isn't very useful against a man who has destroyed several legions, and a hardened army of 25,000 men.

I think they would fought to the end...but they would have lost so many people and have so few good replacements for their fallen they couldn't have held back Hannibal and even if they did it would be decades before they regained their cities influence and power.

Of course they would have been useful - he destroyed those legions in field battles with the benefit of flank and rear attacks where his cavalry could play a dominant role, a role that would be severely restricted in assaults of fortified points. To defend walls they didn't need to be trained as well. Hannibal's veteran army struggled for months against the city of Saguntum, who had nowhere near the same amount of soldiers in its walls, local allies, nor the experience of the Carthaginian army, while Hannibal outnumbered the enemy garrison as well - in this case, the garrison of Rome would have outnumbered him. You're also forgetting the rest of the numbers in the list of further legions from Sicily and Sardinia that could have been transported to Rome quickly, before Hannibal could have gotten there, not to mention the further reinforcements from the legion of marines at Teanum Sidicinum!

[ChrisTheThird]

France and Britian failing to enforce the treaty of Versailles when Hitler ordered a small army to move into the demilitarised Rhineland therefore letting Hitler belive he could do what he liked.(The German troops had orders to retreat if any French or British solders opposed them)

[inox_ionizer]

Hm, do you think that was worse than letting the Germans occupy Sudetenland and annex Austria? At least the Rhineland was within their own borders. Also, easy to criticize in hindsight, particularly about the orders to retreat if opposed, but what if fighting broke out and escalated? Do you think the Brits and French would have been glad they attacked and plunged Europe into a new war?

[xenoargh]

Hannibal's veteran army struggled for months against the city of Saguntum, who had nowhere near the same amount of soldiers in its walls, local allies, nor the experience of the Carthaginian army, while Hannibal outnumbered the enemy garrison as well - in this case, the garrison of Rome would have outnumbered him.

On the one hand, the defenders would have been stretched pretty thin, due to the sheer size of the wall; on the other hand, Hannibal was probably pretty aware that without at least a 5:1 local advantage, he'd be lucky to carry the walls in an escalade.  I doubt if that kind of ratio was something he thought in terms of, as back then sieges were a lot less common, but still, after Saguntum and other places where his army had taken casualties dealing with a fortified point, he probably would have been very cautious.

I think the more important thing that was going on was logistical, though; most likely, the Roman armies that met him at Cannae were pretty thorough about taking the food and other supplies along the roads to Rome, and surely the Romans took steps to make it much more difficult for Hannibal to supply his army if he did anything but march straight there and assault the walls immediately, after having his men march for three weeks straight after a major battle on a line of communications that would have gotten more and more stretched. 

It's very doubtful that Hannibal would have felt comfortable with that kind of timetable or logistical situation. 

In fact, it's fair to say that the biggest strategic mistake made in this whole scenario was for the Romans to give him a battle at all; they should have marched out until they met his outriders, forced his army to deploy for battle, then retreated, over and over again, stretching out his march as much as possible while devastating the land around the roads and sending men behind his front to do as much damage as possible to his communications, while falling back on their own, which would have gotten better as Hannibal's got worse.  Then they would have had plenty of legionnaires to man the walls, or give him battle on ground that was entirely favorable to the Romans.  In short, Hannibal needed the Romans to give him battles in the field, pretty desperately.

The only reason this scenario became a possible strategic victory for Hannibal in the first place is because the Romans panicked, instead of realizing that Hannibal was doing exactly what they wanted him to do- wear his army out and run out of supplies.

[MrExpendable]

Don't know if it was already here, but I personally believe that this one takes the cake.

Even if the accuracy of the story is in doubt, it still makes a good drinking story.

[Olafhelmsborg]

In fact, it's fair to say that the biggest strategic mistake made in this whole scenario was for the Romans to give him a battle at all; they should have marched out until they met his outriders, forced his army to deploy for battle, then retreated, over and over again, stretching out his march as much as possible while devastating the land around the roads and sending men behind his front to do as much damage as possible to his communications, while falling back on their own, which would have gotten better as Hannibal's got worse.  Then they would have had plenty of legionnaires to man the walls, or give him battle on ground that was entirely favorable to the Romans.  In short, Hannibal needed the Romans to give him battles in the field, pretty desperately.

The only reason this scenario became a possible strategic victory for Hannibal in the first place is because the Romans panicked, instead of realizing that Hannibal was doing exactly what they wanted him to do- wear his army out and run out of supplies.

For that they wouldn't have wanted such a large army - it was made for the single purpose of destroying Hannibal in pitched battle - that crazy Roman mindset 'ey! That army would have to act - as it couldn't be supported over a length of time... particularly with Hannibal's capture of the supply depot at Cannae. 

I agree, logistical considerations certainly would have played a part at such a time for Hannibal's march on Rome. Theoretically, according to Shean (Hannibal's Mules) it was possible for pack animals to carry supplies to last for 19 days, and the number of animals would have been far too many available in his position, nor was a single region capable of providing fodder for the animals. If Hannibal had planned to attack Rome, he would have needed to march more than 15 miles a day to reach the wall in time and wanted a continuous march without foraging - for that they'd need 544,920 pack animals, and it was reckoned Hannibal had around 20,000 at any one time. Yes, his reason may well have been something as mundane as a lack of food!

It is interesting to speculate on what problems would have been presented to Hannibal had Longus went ahead with his invasion of Africa, rather than return to Italy in 218 BC!

[Skot the Sanguine]

Don't know if it was already here, but I personally believe that this one takes the cake.

Even if the accuracy of the story is in doubt, it still makes a good drinking story.

It was mentioned somewhere deep in this topic.  That does have to be the worst in history.  Bad enough that a battle was fought amongst the forces of a single nation, but it having such a high casualty tally makes it even more of an epic fail.

As for letting Germany take the Sudetenland and annex Austria, something people seem to gloss over is that Chamberlain knew exactly what he was doing, he was buying England time.  He wasn't a fool and he knew peace would not last despite the famous "peace in our time" comment.  The reality was that, in 1938, England was well behind Germany in terms of ability to wage a war.  The year following saw England get closer to the mark, even if they weren't up to Germany's standards.  Just imagine what the Battle of Britain would have been like if the 109 had no serious competition (the Hurricane was a good plane no doubt but it wasn't on the performance level of the 109).  That is just one example.

[BenKenobi]

As for letting Germany take the Sudetenland and annex Austria, something people seem to gloss over is that Chamberlain knew exactly what he was doing, he was buying England time.  He wasn't a fool and he knew peace would not last despite the famous "peace in our time" comment.  The reality was that, in 1938, England was well behind Germany in terms of ability to wage a war.  The year following saw England get closer to the mark, even if they weren't up to Germany's standards.  Just imagine what the Battle of Britain would have been like if the 109 had no serious competition (the Hurricane was a good plane no doubt but it wasn't on the performance level of the 109).  That is just one example.

Errr...a few points.

1) The scale of power went actually against Britain, because who the hell throw away 37 well equipped and experienced divisions, including 4 armored (although their amount of actual tanks was somehow low). And 18 squadrons of airplanes (in total about 1000 planes), dated (ok, there were some really modern ones, bought from USSR, but majority was biplanes), but still flying, well armed and in some aspects outmatching the german ones. And then there is the fact that these divisions hold a ground on a complete opposite side of a Germany, entrenched in a fortification system that is not finished, but some parts of it even in their state back then easily outmatched the French / Benelux fortification. Besides, retreat plans of Czechoslovakian army were counting with taking positions and heavy defensive warfare, effectively drawing most of german forces from the "western front" (if we excule units appointed for attack on CZE, germany would have 10 infantry divisions, 1 cavalry brigade, and some rather poorly equipped reserve divisions and landwehr. There was strategicaly no better ally against Germany than Czechoslovakia (maybe Poland, but back then they were drifting towards Germany).

2) Germany was in 1938 nowhere as strong as during invasion of Poland. It lacked spare parts and ammo as its production system was expecting the war much later and pretty much focused on building machines only. There were nearly no Pz.IIIs and IVs in service, and as for Messerschmitts, only available versions were B, C and D. The gap between these and Hurris mk.I was not that big, to be honest. And their only military operation before - Anschluss, was quite fail with logistic, even without any resistance at all.

3) Some of the biggest arms factories in Europe were in Czechoslovakia. Ok, they werent technically German until 15/3/1939, but still...they could produce guns and ammo against Germany. By agreement, which led to 15/3/1939 Brits/French basically gave Germany a lot of industry and a large number of tanks and arms of good quality.

4) Munich agreement led Poles to deploy their forces at the borders of a country instead on a Vistula river, which would have been much stronger position.

5) In 1938 western border of Germany was poorly guarded. In 1939 it was not.

6) I would like to see Battle of Britain in 1938/early 1939 with no bases in France. Yes, Hamburg had airport, but you need something little bit closer.

Honestly, I cant think of even one way that Britain benefitted from Munich agreement.

[Skot the Sanguine]

1.  Britain was judging whether it would or could fight a prolonged war at that point.  Although the Czech divisions were capable, lets face the reality that neither France nor Britain would have been able to help them directly in any sizable way...the Czechs would have fallen.  Then what?  France and Britain would have had to shoulder the burden.

2.  Germany was obviously more capable in 1939 than it was in 1938...but the difference wasn't anywhere near what it was between 1938 and 1937 or even more so 1936 and 1937.  The Spanish Civil war honed the German war machine greatly, and by 1938 these lessons were already learned from it.  The He 51 open cockpit biplanes lacking radios and flying in vics of 3 were replaced by Bf 109's with radios and flying in schwarm formations.  Also, the Bf109D that they were using in 1938 (and even at the start of World War II in 1939 with several units) WAS superior to the Hurricane Mk I.  The Hurricane Mk I you are probably basing this from is the three-bladed variable pitch version, but in this period they had a two blade fixed pitch wooden prop...and actually continued to until the Sitzkrieg.  So although it wouldn't change what they entered the war with, it would change how long they would have to use them.  I can't say anything about the stats on tanks, as I don't know what numbers they had at the time, but the aircraft I am confident about.

3.  True

4.  Hard to say that has any relation to any of this.  Who is to say what Poland would or would not have done at any given period.  The more important issue in Poland's fate occurred in 1939, when Russia and Germany signed their agreement.  At that point it wouldn't matter what position Poland took, they were being attacked from both sides.  So, that would indeed mean 1938 would have been a better time to go into the war for them, but who is to say they would have.

5.  I challenge that.  Germany was pretty well guarded and ready for war at this point.  Much of the autobahn, for example, was already completed before this, and it was used to move troops quickly to the borders.

6.  That lacks relevance.  The Battle of Britain came about because of the capture of France, it would have made no difference between whether the war started in 1938 or 1939 for this to come about.  So, for example, if Britain and France went to war with Germany, and all things being equal, France was defeated a year earlier and the Battle of Britain took place in the summer of 1939 instead of 1940...I'd say it would be very different indeed.  Perhaps you are unaware how much of "Stuffy" Dowding's efforts were realized in that one year period.  Before this the high command gave relatively little to fighter command in favor of bomber command since the world had the viewpoint that no matter what happened the bomber would get through...there was a bomber emphasis in the mentality.  Read about Dowding, you will realize just how important both he and that year period were.

Also, Hamburg having an airport is irrelevant to the effort, there were numerous military fields even closer to England from which He-111 and Ju-88 bombers attacked shipping in the North Sea and facilities in the British Isles (mostly northern England and into Scotland).  The main issue would be fighter escort, which having a raid from those positions would be exactly like the only raid from Norway based Luftflotte 5 during the Battle of Britain on August 15th...they were mauled severely.

[BenKenobi]

1.  Britain was judging whether it would or could fight a prolonged war at that point.  Although the Czech divisions were capable, lets face the reality that neither France nor Britain would have been able to help them directly in any sizable way...the Czechs would have fallen.

If there was someone who could not afford to fight a long war, it was Germany. Industry of Germany was focused on building machines, but not so ammunition or spare parts. The worst situation was in Luftwaffe, which had ammunition supply for two weeks of fighting activities (compared to 3 weeks for bombs and 6 weeks of machinegun munition by Invasion of Poland). Pilots were also problem, 40% went only through shortened training. And question is how long would it take Germany to defeat Czechoslovakia and if they could withstand war on two fronts. And also I would like to see attacking with balance of forces 1:1.

2.  Germany was obviously more capable in 1939 than it was in 1938...but the difference wasn't anywhere near what it was between 1938 and 1937 or even more so 1936 and 1937.  ...

By 1st October 1938 Germany had 150 Bf109s ready to defend Reich, other 250 were assigned to assist Fall Grün. + Approximately 400 other fighters unassigned to Fall Grün. 

5.  I challenge that.  Germany was pretty well guarded and ready for war at this point.  Much of the autobahn, for example, was already completed before this, and it was used to move troops quickly to the borders.

Autobahn is all nice and that, but if we exclude divisions assigned to Fall Grün, germany would have about 7 divisions at the west, none of them mechanised or armor. Although I dont know precisely number of french divisions in that time, I would say that they could field 70 divisions without problem.

6.  That lacks relevance.  The Battle of Britain came about because of the capture of France, it would have made no difference between whether the war started in 1938 or 1939 for this to come about.  So, for example, if Britain and France went to war with Germany, and all things being equal, France was defeated a year earlier and the Battle of Britain took place in the summer of 1939 instead of 1940...I

This is nonsense as in 1938 Germany had about 45 divisions total (9 more to be raised (not like you can make it in short time) in case of war with CZE and possibly 22 divisions of Landwehr), compared to 140 in the Battle of France. One does not simply destroy 37 Czechoslovakian divisions with 36 of his own, while repelling Grand Armeé d´France with 7 divisions. And defeat France in the process...

PS: About that tanks: Germany had 1468 Pz.I, 823 Pz.II and very little number of IIIs and IVs, but they were sent back to factories due to some problems, they were not present at units.

PSS: I dont really know what Luftwaffe was like doctrine wise in 1938, but during invasion of Poland Luftwaffe was quite a fail. Poles actually shot down more german planes in air to air combat (109) than germans polish planes in air to air (70...btw Polish AA defense shot down 35 polish planes, nearly 1/2 score of Luftwaffe  ). Luftwaffe was losing 17 planes / day, while Poland 20 planes / day. And Luftwaffe had more planes and planes of much bigger quality (compared to Poland and compared to Luftwaffe of 1938).

[Skot the Sanguine]

Don't believe what you have read about Polish victories during the invasion of Poland, the Germans did quite well.  Even the Bf 110 was mauling the Polish PZL's. The German bombers, of course, had a tougher time of it.

As for the Battle of Britain, I am not saying it was likely that France would have been beaten if it was a year earlier (lets face it, it wasn't even likely in 1940 yet it happened) but if it had THEN England would have had a rougher time of it.

I really wouldn't put much emphasis on France acting offensively...look at their defensive mentality and the Maginot Line.  Though, if they were really only facing 7 divisions, even they might have went into the attack.  I am curious about the number of German divisions ready then though, I will have to check my book of German order of battles and division mobilizations later.

As for German Luftwaffe training...Germany didn't have an issue with that until 1943.  Before that point the Germans had one of the longest and most comprehensive training programs, about a year and a half long.  So shortened training doesn't really apply during this period.

With regards to attacking with a 1:1 ratio of forces...that is what Germany did best, Blitzkrieg is perfect for that.  Look at Russia.

[BenKenobi]

With regards to attacking with a 1:1 ratio of forces...that is what Germany did best, Blitzkrieg is perfect for that.  Look at Russia.

I really love that part where they blitzed through foresty mountains with very little roads against an army that is entrenched, using fortification, ready, ready for falling back, have massive reserve, is awared that the attack will come any minute, have equipment of the same quality (ok...apart from AT guns) and better training. And the best part is blitzing with divisions that are in Hannover or Braunschweig in the day of attack. And the blitz during Anschluss and handling of logistics was also quite impressive...

As for German Luftwaffe training...Germany didn't have an issue with that until 1943.  Before that point the Germans had one of the longest and most comprehensive training programs, about a year and a half long.  So shortened training doesn't really apply during this period.

It does, but not because of manpower shortage as in later stages of war, but simply because Luftwaffe was created in 1935 and they simply didnt manage to train all their crew in 3 years even with pilots already trained before 1935. Same applies for ground forces. Not all soldiers went through the whole training.

Don't believe what you have read about Polish victories during the invasion of Poland, the Germans did quite well.  Even the Bf 110 was mauling the Polish PZL's. The German bombers, of course, had a tougher time of it.

The article I am quoting is unfortunately not in english, but included list of literature is here:

(click to show/hide)

Groehler, Olaf: Letecká válka 1939-1945, Praha 1981.
Chodil, Jiří – Svoboda, Zdeněk: Heinkel He 111, Praha 1994.
John, Miloslav: Září 1938, I. , Brno 1997.
Kocent-Zieliński, Edward: Dornier Do 17, Lublin 1997.
Kowalski, Tomasz J.: Messerschmitt Bf 109 A-E, Warszawa 1989.
Majewski, Piotr M.: Nierozegrana kampania, Warszawa 2004.
Murawski, Marek: Letadla Luftwaffe, díl 1+2, Warszawa 1997.
Shores, Christopher: Začátek cesty - Podivná válka, Plzeň 1996.
Šimek, Karel: Letecká válka v Polsku, České letectvo a PVO č.7-9/1994.
Šmoldas, Zdeněk: Luftwaffe na začátku II.světové války, L+K č.21/1979.
Šmoldas, Zdeněk: Před 40 lety začala II.světová válka, L+K č.19-20/1979.
Valenta, Jaroslav – Vašák, Čestmír: Hodina Ypsilon, Praha 1967.

Thats the best I can do for plausibility of that statement.

As for the Battle of Britain, I am not saying it was likely that France would have been beaten if it was a year earlier (lets face it, it wasn't even likely in 1940 yet it happened) but if it had THEN England would have had a rougher time of it.

While Germany would be perfectly happy with losses from previous wars, need of rebuilding damaged industry, tougher war against Poland, no confiscated arms, attacking with fewer machines and all that jazz. You are acting like if Munich was like: "haha, filthy Germans, we have outfucked you, we now have 1 year in which we will arm ourselves to the teeths, while you are just going to sit on your arses and doing nothing".