I thought that I would move this interesting and productive discussion to a more appropriate thread.
Ambalon said:
What I was saying is that you made a **** analogy and should feel bad for thinking that considering evolution a matter of opinion is the same as believing morality is a matter of opinion. That's what I meant. Unless, of course, you argue that there is something that determines some things are good and some things are evil, and if you deviate from that you are objectively wrong.
I'd like to think that my position is more nuanced - as I've said, I think the morality of an action is a matter of degree, such that we can compare and contrast the moral weight of different actions in relation to one another. To say that actions are either right or wrong suggests a fallacy of false dichotomy, but to say that some actions are more right than others does not.
Regardless, yes, I think that humans are capable of determining whether actions are right or wrong to the extent that they are capable of practicing rational decision making through the processes of induction and deduction.
Ambalon said:
Then, of course, I'd assume you think this morality-settler is (a) god, to which I have no answer and wouldn't want to argue with you.
What an entirely baseless assumption to make. Where have I ever argued that morality comes from a deity? How could I make that argument when I don’t believe in one myself? As I've said on multiple occasions, I maintain that the ability to set and define ethical systems of human behavior rests solely in the hands of humans themselves.
Ambalon said:
Better for what? This is what I mean.
Any number of criteria could be applied to determine that Ted Bundy's morality is worse than Gandhi's. Although, the exact criteria are open to subjective determination for any given individual, that doesn't mean that we can't make objective decisions based on those criteria. But more importantly, I believe that the process of determining applicable moral criteria
can also be the result of a rational (and ideally, deliberative, but that’s another argument)
decision making process. Hopefully I will be able to explain why I believe this is the case in this post.
Ambalon said:
Your point being? That we can compare different moral systems is obvious, but there's no objective parameter other then those you set.
Yes, as I've said this on multiple occasions, I think we are more than capable of setting objective parameters for ethical behavior. But more to your concern, I firmly believe that our ability to set objective parameters is not entirely subjective. These parameters can also be (and often are) the result of a rational decision making process.
Ambalon said:
I don't think I'm actually being clear here but what I mean is that, sure, you can say for instance, that system A is better than system B because, employed, it results, for instance, in the optimal amount of happiness over the group. Great, if that's what you're aiming for. That's what I mean. You can't have a objectively better moral system because all the parameters you'll use are always relative no something else. Again, I'm not sure I was clear, so I'll rephrase it once again and already direct to your next quote: For instance, if a man in country A (therefore with culture A, history A, customs A, etc.) has sex with an unconscious person, he won't be considered evil or wrong or whichever negative quality you want to assign him because of this act. Now say that, in country B (with culture B, history B, customs B, etc.) another man find himself in this same situation and also has sex with an unconscious person. In this place, however, the public opinion would consider him evil would find him wrong and would object to his behavior and would assign him negative qualities.
No, you are being perfectly clear. I just disagree with you.
As an aside, I would generally agree that an optimal amount of happiness (well-being seems to be the more modern term) is a good criteria to use if we want to evaluate the rightness or wrongness of action. But, I believe that my predilection for this criteria is more than a function of my own subjective experience. Rather, I think that this criteria is fitting because it was obtained through a process of observation and logic (the details of which are better explained by far better philosophers than I could ever hope to be
).
Ambalon said:
Is one place right or one place wrong?
Yes, in the scenario that you have laid out, I would argue that A is wrong (or perhaps more accurately, more wrong) and B is right (or more right), barring some circumstances that I am unaware of.
Ambalon said:
Why is one place right and one place wrong?
There could be a number of reasons that might explain why they are right or wrong. Notably, I think that the definition of right and wrong is closely tied to the concept of rationality, so I would like to elaborate on this point. I’m a positivist, so I believe that all authoritative truths (scientific, moral, or otherwise) ultimately stem from a combination of observation and logic. Thus, I believe that humans must be capable of making rational choices (i.e. choices based on or in accordance with reason or logic). This capability allows us to pursue goals and formulate plans and actions based on these goals.
Notably, am presuming that both groups are attempting to pursue a course of ethical action in the scenario that you have provided (i.e. ethics is a goal in this scenario). Obviously, if one group was not attempting to pursue a course of ethical action their reasoning would be amoral (but not necessarily irrational). And, if they were attempting to pursue a course of unethical action, their reasoning would be immoral (but not necessarily irrational). However, it seems clear that both groups think they are operating ethically.
To the extent that I would determine the beliefs of each group to be right or wrong is the extent that I would call these beliefs to be rational or irrational. Notably, the beliefs of Group A might be irrational (and therefore, unethical) for a number of reasons. Perhaps Group A they believes that a person is pursuing an ethical course of action, but they are making this assumption based on illogical inferences, false information, or untenable assumptions (i.e. men don’t have ethical obligations to women because women are borne of sin)?
Ambalon said:
Do the people in A or B believe themselves to be wrong?
Not if they believe that their actions are ethical, no.
Ambalon said:
You can't objectively answer this question like you could, for instance, say that the people in A are wrong for believing, for instance, that it is the Sun and all the other astral bodies that orbit around the Earth.
Sure I could. A belief that the sun orbits around the earth is based on illogical inferences, false information and / or untenable assumptions. Similarly, I think that people A are making their ethical choices based on illogical inferences, false information and / or untenable assumptions.
This is why I think that the metaphor for evolution is perfectly appropriate. The
only difference is that evolution would exist without humans, whereas ethics exists solely as the result of human reasoning. But, this is not logically problematic when ethics is concerned with the description and prescription of
human behavior.
Ambalon said:
No, we can't judge objectively because every single analysis will have subjective interference.
The fact that any given moral analysis is vulnerable to subjective inference does not mean that an objective and rational procedure cannot also occur. If you or I or any human looks at a certain species of flower, we might be able to objectively say that the flower is yellow. But, we also know (objectively, thanks to our shared understanding of biological science!) that a bee sees a very differently colored flower than we do. Does this mean that our objective inference about the flower is wrong? No, because our objective inferences are grounded in a human perspective. All observations are subjectively observed, but this does not mean that these observations cannot also be objective.
Ambalon said:
They might not give the slightest of ****s for the parameters you're measuring their moral system by. Should they give a ****? You think they should, clearly. I think they should, too.
This is important. On what grounds do you think that they should give a ****? Is this solely a result of your subjective experience? Or, are you able to critically evaluate their actions in a given context and culture and recognize that some actions are better than others?
I maintain that the second option is perfectly feasible. And, it is this sort of reasoned process that I believe will lead us to a better system of ethical decision making.
Ambalon said:
That confirms we're right and they're wrong, right? No.
Of course the answer to this is no. The simple fact that we (and most reasonable individuals) would agree on something does not make it correct (although again, I generally think that a process of careful deliberation is the best way of solving questions of ethics). But, the fact that we are presumably making our decision based on accurate observations and solid reasoning (and, that they are making their decision based on inaccurate observations and illogical reasoning) would confirm this.
Ambalon said:
They shouldn't do anything they don't wan't to. No one, nothing should do anything.
Why
shouldn't individuals have to do things they don't want to? That's just your subjective opinion, man.
In all seriousness, I would generally agree with this principal based on my understanding of what it feels like to do something that I don't want to do. This understanding is informed by subjective experience, but it is also formed by an objective and rational (if tautological) understanding of what it means for an individual to "not want something."
And, I am interested in how
you came to this specific conclusion. I suspect that you would agree that the process of induction and deduction is possible. If it wasn't, we would have no grounds for making any arguments ever.
But, would you argue that induction and deduction is not possible concerning questions of morality? This seems like special pleading to me.
Ambalon said:
Reality doesn't give a **** for "shoulds" and "what ifs".
In the sense that some hypothetically-anthropomorphic universe doesn't care about human ethics, yes. I would agree. But the empirical fact is that ethics is an important feature of human reality, both in terms of how we describe our behavior and how we prescribe future action. So, I would say that the reality of our situation is that "shoulds" and "what ifs" are (have been, and always will be) an
incredibly important question for the human race.
Ambalon said:
I can't make this any more obvious to you. If you try to give me any other example, I'll already excuse you of being arsed to write a response: pretend your talking to a child who always asks "why" at your answers. If you can, after asking "why" after every moral analysis and justification, arrive at any answer to which asking "why" makes no sense or one that doesn't end with anything along the lines of "Because God said so", "because I said so", "because Ms. Johnson said so" or "because that's how it is" then please do tell me, because I don't think you can answer this. And that's because there is no answer that doesn't involve opinion.
Hopefully I have been able to avoid justifying my response by making an unreasonable appeal to my own (or any higher power's) authority. Ultimately, my argument rests on the assumption that objective and rational thought based on observation and logical reasoning is not only possible, but the most reliable and accurate way of obtaining the truth. Again, there are scholars far more capable than I who would be better equipped to defend positivism as a philosophy, but I suppose if that discussion were to occur, this would be the place to have it.
